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ARTICLE
MAKING IMPOSSIBLE TAX REFORM POSSIBLE
Susannah Camic Tahk*
The United States has long struggled to reform its federal income tax
code. Despite enthusiastic and widespread bipartisan support for tax
reform laws that would eliminate special-interest loopholes, the legislative
process has been paralyzed when it comes to passing these laws. This
Article proposes a solution to this seemingly intractable federal tax
lawmaking paralysis. This paralysis arises because tax reform spreads its
benefits among broad groups while concentrating its costs on narrow ones.
Political science theory accurately predicts that laws with this cost-benefit
allocation will fail. However, federal lawmakers can overcome tax
lawmaking paralysis by distributing tax reform’s costs and benefits
differently. In particular, the federal government can do this by following
the examples of states that have successfully escaped tax lawmaking
paralysis by earmarking taxes for specific purposes. This Article examines
the phenomenon of earmarking and examines several instances of
earmarked state taxes. In so doing, this Article argues that earmarking tax
revenues for particular purposes offers an opportunity for lawmakers to
permanently reform the tax code at last.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, fervent calls for tax reform in the United States have
crossed party lines. In his 2012 acceptance speech, President Barack
Obama proclaimed that he was “looking forward to reaching out and
working with leaders of both parties to meet the challenges we can only
solve together. Reducing our deficit. Reforming our tax code.”1
Presidential candidate Governor Mitt Romney explained in a debate during
the primary election that, as president, he would begin a process of
“reshaping the entire tax code.”2
Going back in time, two campaigns earlier, President George W. Bush
told the Republican National Convention in 2004 that “[a]nother drag on
our economy is the current tax code, which is a complicated mess, filled
with special interest loopholes, saddling our people with more than 6 billion
hours of paperwork and headache every year.”3 In 1985, President Ronald
Reagan spoke to the nation, telling his listeners that he had “proposed a
sweeping new reform that will . . . reduce the many special tax privileges.”4
President Jimmy Carter attempted similar reforms, telling the Democratic

1. President Obama’s Acceptance Speech (Full Transcript), WASH. POST (Nov. 7,
2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-07/politics/35506456_1_applause-obama
-sign-romney-sign/2.
2. Mitt Romney, Republican Debate Transcript, Tampa, Florida, January 2012,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2012/republicandebate-transcript-tampa-florida-january-2012/p27180.
3. President Bush’s Acceptance Speech to the Republican National Convention, WASH.
POST (Sept. 2, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57466-2004Sep2.
html.
4. Address to the Nation on Tax Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 705 (June 1, 1985).

2013]

MAKING IMPOSSIBLE TAX REFORM POSSIBLE

2685

National Convention in 1976 that “[i]t is time for a complete overhaul of
our income tax system.”5
Going still further back in time, in 1974, President Gerald Ford supported
a “tax reform bill [that would raise revenue with] . . . a windfall tax, profits
tax on oil producers, and by closing other loopholes.”6 Addressing
Congress in 1961, President John F. Kennedy said that “[i]t will be a major
aim of our tax reform program to . . . [broaden] . . . the tax base and
[reconsider] . . . the rate structure. The result should be a tax system that is
more equitable, more efficient and more conducive to economic growth.”7
In their appeals for tax reform, these leaders from both sides of the aisle,
including both candidates in the 2012 presidential election, all advocated
“broadening the income tax base,” which entails subjecting more income to
tax by eliminating tax preferences.8 These preferences usually take the
form of exclusions, deductions, credits, and special rates, many of which
are the hated tax “loopholes” so bemoaned in popular and academic
commentary alike.
Broadening the income tax base allows lawmakers to lower baseline
income tax rates for hundreds of millions of citizens without losing
revenue. This is because a large tax base subject to a low rate can raise the
same amount of revenue as a smaller tax base subject to a higher rate. If the
tax code9 gains exclusions, deductions, credits, and special rates, lawmakers
must raise rates to maintain revenue levels. Conversely, cutting tax
preferences allows lawmakers to lower tax rates. In this way, “tax
reform”—broadening the tax base by excising loopholes—gives politicians
a chance to offer widespread benefits for huge numbers of constituents.
Lawmakers can accomplish tax reform incrementally, cutting one tax
loophole at a time, or take a comprehensive approach, slashing large
bundles of preferences at once.
As popular as this goal is across the political spectrum, it is nearly
impossible to accomplish. “As appealing as the concept sound[s],” wrote
journalists Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray in the 1980s, “few . . .
thought it could be done.”10 Observers from popular-press and academic
perspectives alike have used the word “impossible” to describe tax

5. President Jimmy Carter, “Our Nation’s Past and Future”: Address Accepting the
Presidential Nomination at the Democratic Nat’l Convention in N.Y.C. (July 15, 1976),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25953.
6. Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Economy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 228 (Oct. 8,
1974).
7. Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 290 (Apr. 20, 1961).
8. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Reform, Federal, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.tax
policycenter.org/taxtopics/encyclopedia/Tax-Reform.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
9. The phrase “tax code” refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
found in Title 26 of the U.S. Code.
10. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 13 (1987).
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reform.11 As late as the summer of 2012, a popular Washington Post
blogger titled a post, Tax Reform Is Going To Be Really, Really Hard.12
Further, as hard as tax reform is to enact, it is even harder to maintain.
Even the few tax reform packages that have become law have fallen apart
within several years of passage.13 No matter how many powerful figures
from both sides of the aisle support tax reform, getting it done successfully
remains elusive. I call this problem federal tax lawmaking “paralysis.”
This Article proposes a partial solution to this seemingly intractable
problem. Federal tax lawmaking paralysis arises because tax reform
distributes its costs and benefits in ways that doom it to failure. In
particular, as I will discuss, federal tax reform has highly concentrated costs
and extremely diffuse benefits. Political science theory predicts that laws
with concentrated costs and diffuse benefits will not succeed. Viewed from
this perspective, tax reform’s difficulties are not surprising.
This
perspective also reveals, however, that tax reformers can overcome federal
tax lawmaking paralysis by distributing tax reform’s costs and benefits
differently.
How states have structured their tax laws makes evident how reformers
might do this. In particular, many states earmark14 specific taxes for
specific programs that benefit concentrated groups. As a result, these
concentrated groups work to protect those taxes. In this way, the costbenefit allocation that paralyzes federal income tax lawmaking would not
present a problem for earmarked taxes. In fact, examining specific
earmarked taxes shows that many of them have attracted defenders who can
guard against would-be preferences and loopholes. For this reason,
earmarking tax revenues for particular purposes offers a path out of tax
lawmaking paralysis and creates opportunities for genuine tax reform.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I explores federal tax lawmaking
paralysis in detail and explain the ways in which it has come to pervade the
U.S. income tax system. Part II demonstrates how the earmarking
mechanism can allow tax lawmakers to escape this paralysis. Part II.A
describes how states have employed the earmarking device. Part II.B
explains how this device addresses the tax lawmaking paralysis problem.
Part II.C discusses how to address the risks of earmarking. Part II.D
11. See id.; David R. Beam, Timothy J. Conlan & Margaret J. Wrightson, Solving the
Riddle of Tax Reform: Party Competition and the Politics of Ideas, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 193,
194 (1990).
12. Ezra Klein, Tax Reform Is Going To Be Really, Really Hard, WONKBLOG (Aug. 10,
2012, 9:05 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/08/10/taxreform-is-going-to-be-really-really-hard/.
13. See ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY
CHANGES ARE ENACTED 35–55 (2008); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns:
A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002); Michael J. Graetz,
Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 VA. L. REV. 1389 (1972).
14. “Earmarking” a tax’s revenues means designating a tax’s revenues for a particular
purpose. The term “earmark” also refers to an unpopular form of federal special interest
spending. See generally Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and
Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (2009).
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discusses several situations in which the earmarking has effectively
overcome tax lawmaking paralysis. These situations include four case
studies that I have developed using archival material on state tax laws.
These case studies show how state-level earmarked taxes have in fact
successfully evaded the cost-benefit allocation that gives rise to tax
lawmaking paralysis.
I. FEDERAL TAX LAWMAKING IS PARALYZED
Ezra Klein, a prominent economic commentator, recently made the
following observation about tax reform:
As polarized as Washington is over tax and budget issues, a basebroadening, rate-lowering tax-code overhaul has become the one policy
every wonk in town can agree on. It formed the core of the SimpsonBowles deficit-reduction plan,15 as well as the Domenici-Rivlin
proposal.16 It was the cornerstone of the supercommittee’s failed
negotiations.17 It has been talked up by Sen. Max Baucus, the top Senate
Democrat on tax issues, and by Rep. Dave Camp, the Republican who
heads the tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee. Romney,
President Barack Obama and House Budget Committee Chairman Paul
Ryan have all endorsed the idea.18

Yet, Klein went on to note that each of these Washington movers and
shakers has been paralyzed in his efforts to reform the tax code.19 Why
does the tax system face this paralysis? The following section will first
describe the paralysis problem and then turn to explain why this problem
persists.
A. Federal Tax Lawmaking Paralysis Throughout Recent U.S. History
Tax reformers in the United States have not failed for lack of trying. Yet
their endeavors make for a near-tragic narrative. As Birnbaum and Murray
wrote in 1987, “[t]he [then-]seventy-three-year history of the income tax
had been a story of steady erosion in the tax base, with more and more
loopholes being added and few being taken away.”20 Perhaps the most
15. This is the report issued from President Obama’s bipartisan National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, or, in popular parlance, “deficit reduction commission,”
convened on November 10, 2010. See Co-Chairs’ Proposal, FISCALCOMMISSON.GOV, http://
www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/CoChair_Draft.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
16. This debt reduction report came out of the Bipartisan Policy Center, founded in 2007
by Republican senators Bob Dole and Howard Baker and Democratic senators Tom Daschle
and George Mitchell. See About the Bipartisan Policy Center, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER,
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/about (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
17. The Budget Control Act of 2011 created this bipartisan Joint Select Committee on
Deficit Reduction. For a description of this “supercommittee” and its members, see Chris
Good, Meet the Super Committee, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/08/meet-the-super-committee/243495/.
18. Klein, supra note 12.
19. Id.
20. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 13.
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remarkable part is the reformers’ unwillingness to abandon their cause in
the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
The first president to undertake serious tax reform efforts was President
John F. Kennedy.21 For the highest tax policymaking position in his
administration, President Kennedy selected Stanley Surrey, a Harvard law
professor and dedicated opponent of tax loopholes and, in fact, of most uses
of the tax code for nonrevenue-raising purposes.22 Interest groups strongly
opposed the appointment, unleashing a “storm of protest.”23 Senator Harry
Byrd, chair of the Senate Finance Committee (the Senate committee
responsible for tax legislation), let Surrey know that loophole-closing
reform legislation would certainly die before the committee due to interest
group opposition.24 As a result, in the early part of President Kennedy’s
administration, his “reform efforts wilted.”25 He tried again in 1963,
proposing many of Surrey’s loophole closers, but the Congressional taxwriting committees killed all of these proposals.26
The next serious tax reform efforts emerged in the late 1960s. In 1967,
the Treasury Department began working on a major tax reform package.
The Treasury released it in 1969, timed to coincide with a speech from
Treasury Secretary Joseph Barr “warning of a ‘tax revolt’ based on the
inequities in the tax code, particularly the ‘loopholes’ that permitted the
very rich to avoid taxation.”27 Perhaps as a result, in 1969, Congress finally
passed a piece of tax reform legislation, the Tax Reform Act of 1969.28
Although this law successfully excised a number of tax loopholes, “the
reform victory was short-lived.”29 In the years that immediately followed,
“subsequent legislation reopened most of the closed loopholes.”30 Tax
reform’s prospects worsened in 1974 when Representative Wilbur D. Mills,
the powerful chair of the House’s tax-writing committee—the House Ways
and Means Committee—resigned from the House after a sex scandal.31
Mills had been a committed advocate of tax reform and had worked hard to
“constrain the growth of the tax-break system.”32 After his resignation,
however, the tax legislative process and its rules became increasingly
receptive to interest group participation.33 According to political scientist
Eric Patashnik, “[t]he immediate winners from these changes were
lobbyists, who found it easier to obtain special tax benefits for their
21. See JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
155–56 (1985).
22. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 14.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. WITTE, supra note 21, at 166.
28. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
29. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 37.
30. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 14.
31. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 37.
32. Id.
33. Id.

2013]

MAKING IMPOSSIBLE TAX REFORM POSSIBLE

2689

clients.”34 In this period, new special preferences flooded the tax code.
Even the so-called Tax Reform Act of 1976 added a variety of loopholes
and made the tax code “more, not less, complex.”35
This deluge prompted then-presidential candidate Jimmy Carter to
propose, as a key plank of his 1976 campaign platform, “comprehensive,
total tax reform” that would “eliminate hundreds of tax breaks and greatly
reduce the tax rate.”36 Proposing tax reform in 1978, President Carter told
Congress that “[f]undamental reform of our tax laws is essential and should
begin right now. . . . constitut[ing] a major step towards sustaining our
economic recovery and making our tax system fairer and simpler.”37
President Carter’s proposal “followed very closely the classic formulation
for tax reform” and “advocated broadening the tax base by eliminating or
tightening tax reduction provisions; [to] . . . simplify the tax system” and
lower rates.38 Although most tax policy experts applauded President
Carter’s plan and found his case for reform “extremely powerful, most
knowledgeable observers believed the prospects for its adoption were
exceedingly dim.”39 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Congress gutted President
Carter’s reform plans and passed a bill that was “a complete renunciation of
the Carter tax proposals and any notion of tax reform.”40 Instead, the
would-be tax reform package, enacted in 1978, “expand[ed] many existing
tax breaks and add[ed] numerous new provisions targeted to help farmers,
teachers, native Alaskans, railroads, record manufacturers, the Gallo winery
of California, and two Arkansas chicken farmers.”41 The period that
followed “signaled a new era in tax policy, the triumph of a broad coalition
of business lobbyists who came together under the rubric of ‘capital
formation,’” and stuffed the tax code full of new loopholes and industryspecific—and, in some cases, company-specific—preferences.42 Congress
passed several tax bills during this period, but none envisioned major basebroadening reform.43
Then, the Tax Reform Act of 198644 (1986 Act) arrived. In 1986, the
stars aligned to create what multiple observers have called a political or
legislative “miracle.”45 Political entrepreneurs from both sides of the aisle,
34. Id.
35. WITTE, supra note 21, at 196.
36. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 15.
37. Economic Report and Tax and Budget Messages: Remarks at the Signing
Ceremony, 1 PUB. PAPERS 123 (Jan. 20, 1978).
38. WITTE, supra note 21, at 205.
39. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 38.
40. WITTE, supra note 21, at 213.
41. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 16.
42. Id.
43. E.g., Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C).
44. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
45. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 285; Michael J. Graetz, The Truth About
Tax Reform, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 617, 619 (1988).
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including President Ronald Reagan, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan,
White House Chief of Staff James Baker, Senator Bob Packwood, Senator
Bill Bradley, Representative Jack Kemp, and Representative Dan
Rostenkowski, “employed virtually every strategy in the book”46 to pass a
meaningful tax reform bill that was, in President Reagan’s words, “a
triumph for the American people and the American system.”47 To pass the
1986 Act, Congress and the Reagan Administration exerted massive effort
in the face of major interest group resistance to excise from the tax code
hundreds of loopholes and special-interest tax preferences and to use the
resulting increase in revenue to cut tax rates substantially across the
board.48 Celebrating the legislative achievement in the 1986 Act’s signing
statement, President Reagan cited a Washington Post headline: “The
Impossible Became the Inevitable.”49
The 1986 Act was a remarkable piece of legislation indeed, distinguished
by the “sheer number of credits and deductions scrapped,”50 including highrevenue items such as tax preference for capital gains, large breaks for the
oil and gas industries, deductions for state and local sales taxes and interest,
favorable rules for business entertainment, and a number of provisions that
had previously allowed tax shelter activity.51 All of this loophole-closing
allowed Congress to replace the preexisting multilevel rate structure, which
had a top marginal rate of 50 percent, with a simple rate schedule with just
two rates: 15 percent and 28 percent.52 As a result, the 1986 Act gave four
out of five individual taxpayers tax cuts.53 In the wake of the 1986 Act,
commentators from the popular and academic presses alike rushed to study
this “legislative miracle.”54 Scholars of tax policy and of politics wanted to
understand how a few political entrepreneurs had overcome such substantial
interest group resistance to remove so many preferences and loopholes at
once.

46. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 213 (1990); David
E. Rosenbaum, A Tax Bill for the Textbooks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at D16.
47. Negotiators Formally OK New Tax Bill, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 17, 1986, § 1, at 1.
48. See generally BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10; Beam, Conlan & Wrightson,
supra note 11; Rosenbaum, supra note 46 (discussing the difficulties of passing the 1986
Act).
49. Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1414 (Oct. 22,
1986).
50. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 43.
51. Pub. L. No. 99-514, tits. I.D–I.E, III, IV.B, § 411–413, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113–21,
2216–21, 2225–27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
52. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 40.
53. Id.
54. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 285; TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, MARGARET
T. WRIGHTSON & DAVID R. BEAM, TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM (1990);
Beam, Conlan & Wrightson, supra note 11, at 202; Dennis Coyle & Aaron Wildavsky,
Requisites of Radical Reform: Income Maintenance Versus Tax Preferences, 7 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 11–17 (1987); James M. Verdier, The President, Congress, and Tax
Reform: Patterns over Three Decades, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 114, 121–23
(1988).
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To this day, observers from a variety of political perspectives recognize
the 1986 Act as a major legislative accomplishment. For instance, Robert
McIntyre, head of the left-leaning Citizens for Tax Justice recently said
that, with the 1986 Act,
Congress approved and the president signed what many called the most
monumental tax reform bill in American history. Six million low-income
families were taken off the income tax rolls, and taxes were reduced for
80 percent of middle-income Americans. And the well-off freeloaders,
both corporate and individual, were told to start paying again.55

President Reagan’s chief economic adviser, Harvard economist Martin
Feldstein, also recently applauded, “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a
powerful, positive force for the American economy.”56 He continued,
heralding that “[e]qually important, as we look back on it after 25 years, we
. . . see that it taught us . . . that politicians with very different political
philosophies on the right and on the left could agree on a major program of
tax rate reductions and tax reform.”57
Since 1986, however, the miracle of the 1986 Act has almost entirely
fallen apart. No sooner had the bill passed than members of Congress and
their constituencies hurried to refill the tax code with loopholes and
preferences. Consequently, tax rates again started to rise. Between 1986
and 2010, the number of tax preferences, many of which are quite narrowly
targeted, has rapidly increased, along with the share of GDP that those
preferences represent.58 Tax historian Joseph Thorndike summarized the
reigning scholarly consensus when he recently wrote of the 1986 Act that
the law’s achievements began to erode almost immediately. In the early
1990s, persistent deficit worries prompted lawmakers to raise rates,
especially on high-income taxpayers. These same fiscal pressures
prompted a surge of tax expenditures, as lawmakers cast about for ways to
spend money without looking like they were doing it. Ultimately, the
high-minded ideals of traditional tax reform proved no match for the
resurgent political traditions of American democracy. The anomaly of
[the] 1986 [Act]—like an episode of sunspots—was over.59

New York University tax scholar Daniel Shaviro echoed this view when,
upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1986 Act, he observed how “the
grand bargain of base broadening for rate reduction,” has, in the years since
1986, “slowly unraveled.”60 On the same anniversary, Michael Graetz of
Yale and Columbia similarly pointed out that “[t]he 1986 tax reform gave
55. Robert S. McIntyre, Remembering the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 133 TAX NOTES 351,
356 (2011).
56. Martin Feldstein, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Comments on the 25th Anniversary,
133 TAX NOTES 343, 343 (2011).
57. Id.
58. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 20 (2011).
59. Joseph J. Thorndike, 1986? Who Cares?, 133 TAX NOTES 349, 349 (2011).
60. Daniel N. Shaviro, 1986-Style Tax Reform: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Passed,
131 TAX NOTES 817, 818 (2011).
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our income tax a good cleansing, but its ink had hardly dried before
Congress started adding new tax breaks and raising rates.”61 In The
Washington Post, journalist Jeffrey Birnbaum, chronicler of the 1986 Act’s
passage, recently wrote an article entitled Historic Tax Code Changes
Eroded Since 1986.62 In it, he bemoaned that,
while vestiges of the historic measure remain, the tax code has been
allowed to revert in many ways to its pre-1986 form and politicians of
both parties are eager to push it back further. It has been repopulated with
dozens of targeted tax breaks and its rates have not only gone up, but the
number of brackets have multiplied.63

He quoted former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Mark
Weinberger explaining what has gone wrong: “Unfortunately, as tax bills
wind through Congress, special interests get to them.”64 Along similar
lines, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and IRS Commissioner
Fred T. Goldberg Jr. recently testified before Congress:
The [Tax Reform] Act [of 1986] did indeed broaden the base and lower
rates, and was an improvement over prior law in important respects. But
whatever those gains may have been, they were transitory at best. The tax
system today is grotesquely complicated. It is perceived as unfair from
every point on the political spectrum—from the most liberal Democrat to
the most conservative Republican. It has caused gross distortions in the
allocation of resources, and has played a significant role in eroding our
competitive position in a global economy.65

Patashnik, in his study of how legislatures succeed or fail at maintaining
reforms over long periods of time, makes a case study of the 1986 Act,
using it as a classic example of an unsustainable reform. He writes, “A key
test of the durability of a reform is whether subsequent politicians who were
not official parties to the bargain feel constrained by it.”66 This test is one
that the 1986 Act emphatically failed. Following President Reagan,
President George H.W. Bush called for reinstating the preferential rate on
capital gains and blessed a series of additional tax preferences, most notably
for oil exploration and small business, “signaling to lobbyists that his
Administration was in the tax-break business.”67 Between 1987 and 1998,
eight in ten members of Congress sponsored or cosponsored legislation to
provide special treatment for particular industries, amounting to more than
700 tax bills introduced in the House of Representatives or the Senate
61. Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform 1986: A Silver Anniversary, Not A Jubilee, 133 TAX
NOTES 313, 321 (2011).
62. Jeffery H. Birnbaum, Historic Tax Changes Eroded in Years Since 1986, WASH.
POST, June 7, 2004, at A1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. How Did We Get Here? Changes in the Law and Tax Environment Since the Tax
Reform Act of 1986: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 40 (2011)
(statement of Fred. T. Goldberg Jr., Former Asst. Sec’y, Treasury for Tax Policy).
66. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 43.
67. Id.
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during this period.68 Almost all of these bills proposed new preferences
rather than cutting old ones.69 This trend continued into the next decade,
with the American Jobs Creation Act of 200470 creating particular
provisions, among many others, for “tackle box makers, Native Alaskan
whaling captains, restaurant owners, Hollywood producers, makers of bows
and arrows, NASCAR track owners, and importers of Chinese ceiling
fans.”71
According to Patashnik’s analysis, this reversal occurred because the
1986 Act, the one truly meaningful tax reform bill ever to pass Congress,
failed to alter the “political dynamic” of tax lawmaking.72 He cites
prominent economist Milton Friedman, who predicted soon after the 1986
Act’s passage that “[n]othing has changed to prevent the process that
produced our present tax system from starting over. As lobbyists get back
into action, and as members of Congress try to raise campaign funds, old
loopholes will be reintroduced and new ones invented.”73 He points out
that, following the 1986 Act, most of the interest groups that had opposed
the legislation were still powerful and had plenty of time and resources left
to devote to expressing their opposition and attempting to reverse what
Congress had done in 1986.74 Even interest groups that had supported the
1986 reform started to hack away at it as soon as they needed a tax
preference.75 One prominent lobbyist described the common post-1986
attitude among interest groups as follows: “If you can have your cake and
eat it, too, and have no change in the [lowered] rates and get goodies . . .
well, why not?”76
Further, the members of Congress who depended on tax-related
campaign donations continued to do so. Seats on the tax-writing
committees remained reliable sources of campaign funds.77 When
Congress was writing the 1986 Act, members of the House Ways and
Means Committee, which handles tax legislation, received on average a 24
percent increase in contributions during the 1985–86 cycle.78 Rather than
decline in the face of a newly reformed tax code with fewer loopholes, that
figure only continued to increase after that cycle.79
In 2005, tax reform supporter President George W. Bush appointed a
prominent bipartisan commission on tax reform. The commission strongly
supported classic rate-lowering, base-broadening reform in the style of the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 44.
Id.
Pub. L. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 54.
See id. at 51.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52.
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1986 Act. Explaining reasons for that recommendation, the members of the
commission wrote:
Since the 1986 tax reform bill passed, there have been nearly 15,000
changes to the tax code—equal to more than two changes a day. Each
one of these changes had a sponsor, and each had a rationale to defend it.
Each one was passed by Congress and signed into law. . . . In retrospect,
it is clear that frequent changes to the tax code, no matter how wellintentioned, ultimately undermine the integrity of the code in real and
significant ways.80

The commission went on to advocate a detailed series of reforms, including
eliminating such large preferences as the ones for home mortgage interest
and employer-provided health insurance.81 The affected interest groups,
including realtors and life insurance firms, jumped into action to oppose the
proposal, however, and none of the commission’s proposals became law.
Similarly, despite the fact that President Obama has made tax reform a
plank of both his 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns and has proposed
major loophole-closing reforms in each of his budgets since winning office,
his tax reform plans have also gone nowhere.82
Perhaps in part because the income tax has been so difficult to reform, it
remains unpopular with Americans, and most favor cutting it. For example,
a recent poll asked respondents, “It is now agreed that, because the United
States is in a recession and at war, the federal government will be in a
deficit for the next few years. Given this, please tell me whether you would
favor or oppose . . . providing tax cuts for middle- and low-income
individuals.”83 In response, 80 percent of survey participants favored tax
cuts, with another 4 percent answering “not sure” or “it depends.”84
Without the deficit prompt, the number of respondents favoring cuts rises to
87 percent.85

80. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR & PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM vi (2005), available at http://permanent.
access.gpo.gov/lps64969/TaxReformwholedoc.pdf.
81. See generally id.
82. For a summary of President Obama’s proposed loophole-closing reforms, none of
which have become law, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2013, at 196–212 (2012); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2012, at 198–212 (2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2011, at 170–192 (2010); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2010, at 265–276 (2009).
83. NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, Feb. 2009, ROPER CENTER, http://tinyurl.com/
buhrg5t (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
84. Id.
85. Gallup/USA Today Poll, Jan. 2008, ROPER CENTER, http://tinyurl.com/apvydym (last
visited Mar. 19, 2013).
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As for the basis of this attitude, tax scholars have linked the income tax’s
unpopularity to the fact that taxpayers do not understand what the tax’s
revenues fund. Professor Graetz writes:
Recently retired congressman Beryl Anthony of Arkansas clearly linked
anti-government sentiment and tax resistance: “The voters clearly believe
government is not giving anywhere close to a dollar’s worth of value for a
dollar’s worth of taxes.” The singer and songwriter Richie Havens
captured this sentiment more graphically when he said, “We should pay
for what we get, not for what we don’t get. What we don’t get is just
about everything.”86

B. Understanding Federal Tax Lawmaking Paralysis
In light of the subsequent history of the 1986 Act, the federal tax system
presently appears completely paralyzed when it comes to reform.
Observers agree that passing the 1986 Act was a political miracle, the likes
of which have never otherwise happened in the income tax’s ninety-nine
year history.87 But even that miracle did nothing to overcome this paralysis
in any sustained manner. Reform happened, fell apart, and seems unlikely
to happen again any time soon. While politicians continue to promise tax
reform, its prospects seem very dim.
While the tax literature to date devotes substantial time to studying the
details of different federal tax reform packages,88 it offers no theoretical
framework for understanding why federal tax reform lawmaking is
paralyzed. For this reason, the tax literature has no solution to tax
lawmaking paralysis. The existing scholarship has a great deal to say about
the costs and benefits of different reform proposals that have, or perhaps
should have, been tried.89 Existing scholarship also has a great deal to say
about what tax reform should look like going forward, should it pass.90
Different scholars have different lists, all long, of the loopholes that most
86. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT GOT THAT WAY,
AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 6 (1999).
87. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 285; CONLAN, WRIGHTSON & BEAM,
supra note 54, at 1.
88. See generally, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 86, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Report of the
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform: A Critical Assessment and a Proposal,
59 SMU L. REV. 551 (2006); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an
Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); Michael J.
Graetz, Taxes That Work: A Simple American Plan, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1043 (2006); Daniel N.
Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91
(2004); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L.
1 (2011).
89. See generally, e.g., David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit: Statutory Construction,
Regulatory Interpretation and Policy Incoherence, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 63
(2004); Fred T. Goldberg Jr. & Susannah Camic, Tax Credits for Health Insurance, 37 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 73 (2009); Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The
Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000);
Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1055 (2000).
90. See sources cited supra note 89.
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need closing, of preferences that have most clearly ceased to serve their
original purposes, and of breaks whose costs to federal revenue have most
substantially outpaced their social benefits.91 Nevertheless, no tax
scholarship proposes a way to overcome this paralysis and to enable some
of these reforms to become law.
Understanding this paralysis and what might overcome it requires instead
a broader look at how interest groups function more generally. What
factors particular to federal tax law paralyze its developmental apparatus?
Interest group theory from political science provides an answer to this
question. Theories of regulation, particularly those following Harvard
political scientist James Q. Wilson’s famous work on the subject, have
argued that how a law distributes its costs and benefits determines how easy
that law is to pass and to sustain.92 Significantly, tax scholars have yet to
consider using this cost-benefit framework in the context of tax lawmaking.
Yet this framework can explain federal tax lawmaking paralysis and, more
importantly, suggests a previously neglected path out of that paralysis.
According to Wilson’s framework, laws have either concentrated costs
or diffuse costs.93 Laws also have either concentrated benefits or diffuse
benefits.94 Laws with concentrated costs or benefits focus their costs or
benefits on a particular, narrow group, such that every member of the group
receives a substantial cost or benefit. In contrast, laws with diffuse costs or
benefits spread those costs or benefits over a broad group so that every
member of this large set receives a small cost or benefit. This cost-benefit
feature of laws is, according to this argument, very important to legal
development.95 The following diagram demonstrates the four types of
possible laws under this cost-benefit framework.

91. See sources cited supra note 89.
92. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). For later development of this theory, see, for example,
Michael D. Reagan, The Politics of Regulatory Reform, 36. W. POL. Q. 149 (1983); Elaine B.
Sharp, The Dynamics of Issue Expansion: Cases from Disability Rights and Fetal Research
Controversy, 56 J. POL. 919 (1994); Charles R. Shipan, Regulatory Regimes, Agency
Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 467
(2004); Bruce A. Williams & Albert R. Matheny, Testing Theories of Social Regulation:
Hazardous Waste Regulation in the American States, 46 J. POL. 428 (1984); B. Dan Wood &
Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 801 (1991); B. Dan Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC? 34 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 503 (1990).
93. See Wilson, supra note 92, at 367.
94. One can debate whether a handful of laws fall in a gray area but, as a general matter,
this is how laws distribute costs and benefits.
95. Wilson, supra note 92, at 367–70.
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Table 1: Cost-Benefit Framework
Costs
Benefits

Diffuse costs

Concentrated costs

Diffuse
benefits

Quadrant 1
Diffuse costs,
diffuse benefits
(“majoritarian
politics”)

Quadrant 3
Concentrated costs,
diffuse benefits
(“entrepreneurial
politics”)

Concentrated
benefits

Quadrant 2
Diffuse costs,
concentrated
benefits
(“client politics”)

Quadrant 4
Concentrated costs,
concentrated benefits
(“interest group
politics”)

To understand this framework, let’s begin with Quadrant 2 in the table.
A law from Quadrant 2 has diffuse costs and concentrated benefits and,
according to the theory, will likely be easy to enact and to expand. The
costs of laws of this type are too widely shared to provide any group a
strong enough incentive to organize against them.96 The benefits are
concentrated in groups that work hard to organize and advocate for these
laws.97 Wilson calls the politics of Quadrant 2 “client politics.”98 In this
quadrant,
[s]ome small, easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful
incentive to organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are distributed at
a low per capita rate over a large number of people, and hence they have
little incentive to organize in opposition—if, indeed, they even hear of the
policy.99

Examples of Quadrant 2 client politics from the nontax areas of public
policy include “less conspicuous regulatory programs, such as state laws
that license (and protect) occupations” or “where the government is
supplying a cash subsidy to an industry or occupation.”100
Conversely, this theory holds that laws that have diffuse benefits and
concentrated costs (i.e., Quadrant 3 laws) get nowhere.101 In these cases,
the particular groups that stand to bear the concentrated costs work hard to
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370.
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resist these laws. However, no group has a sufficient incentive to fight for
these laws. As the author of a subsequent study about this typology
explains, “the powerful group that would have costs imposed on it [by a
Quadrant 3 law] will organize in opposition while diffuse unorganized
beneficiaries have no incentive to push for the policy at issue.”102
Wilson calls Quadrant 3 politics “entrepreneurial politics” because
powerful political entrepreneurs must mobilize if a Quadrant 3 policy is
ever to pass.103 Wilson explains the difficulty of policymaking in Quadrant
3: “Since the incentive to organize is strong for opponents of the policy but
weak for the beneficiaries, and since the political system provides many
points at which opposition can be registered, it may seem astonishing that
regulatory legislation of this sort is ever passed.”104 An exception, he
points out, is consumer-safety regulation of the type that Ralph Nader, “a
skilled entrepreneur who can mobilize latent public sentiment,” was
instrumental in passing.105
Lawmaking in the other two quadrants is neither as easy as that in client
politics (Quadrant 2) or as difficult as that in entrepreneurial politics
(Quadrant 3). Quadrant 1 is home to the “majoritarian politics” of laws
whose costs and benefits are both widely distributed.106 Here, “[a]ll or
most of society expects to gain; all or most of society expects to pay.”107
For this reason, “[i]nterest groups have little incentive to form around such
issues because no small, definable segment of society (an industry, an
occupation, a locality) can expect to capture a disproportionate share of the
benefits or avoid a disproportionate share of the burdens.”108 Quadrant 1
laws sometimes pass and sometimes do not, depending on whether the
proposals make it onto the political agenda at all, whether lawmakers agree
that the law is a legitimate government action, and whether sufficient
numbers of involved parties agree with the proposed law ideologically.109
According to Wilson, examples include maintaining a large standing army
in the years following World War II, the Sherman Antitrust Act,110 and the
Federal Trade Commission Act.111 In all of these cases, “[n]o single
industry was to be regulated; the nature and scope of the proposed
regulations were left vague; any given firm could imagine ways in which
these laws might help them.”112 None of these laws inspired “determined
industry opposition,” but, to pass, each required mass public support.113

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Sharp, supra note 92, at 921–22.
Wilson, supra note 92, at 370.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).
Id. §§ 41–58; Wilson, supra note 92, at 367.
Wilson, supra note 92, at 367–68.
Id. at 368.
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Quadrant 4 laws, which give rise to “interest group politics,” also have
mixed success in terms of passage. Here, “[a] subsidy or regulation will
often benefit a relatively small group at the expense of another comparable
small group.”114 With regard to Quadrant 4 laws, “[e]ach side has a strong
incentive to organize and exercise political influence.”115 Mass opinion
rarely plays a major role because “[t]he public does not believe it will be
much affected one way or another; though it may sympathize more with
one side than the other, its voice is likely to be heard in only weak or
general terms.”116 In “[m]ost examples of interest-group politics,” neither
interest group is the total victor and instead, there is “something in the final
legislation to please each affected party.”117 Labor laws, including
landmarks such as the Wagner Act118 and Taft-Hartley Act,119 often fall
into this category.120
Extending Wilson’s framework to the study of tax legislation offers a
fruitful way to understand tax lawmaking paralysis. Wilson’s analysis
suggests that governmental units are likely to become paralyzed when
trying to enact Quadrant 3 laws (i.e., laws with diffuse benefits and
concentrated costs). Throughout its recent history, federal tax reform
legislation is indeed of this very type. Reforming the federal tax code by
closing loopholes has very diffuse benefits and very concentrated costs—a
classic Quadrant 3 scenario. When tax lawmakers opt to close a loophole or
a series of loopholes, the benefits from doing so are quite diffuse. Closing
loopholes allows the federal government either to lower tax rates across the
board or, in the alternative, to grow its fund of general revenue and to
distribute this increased revenue across multiple federal programs.
Accordingly, when lawmakers seek to reform the tax code, potential
beneficiaries fall into two amorphous groups: (i) all individuals who pay
federal taxes and (ii) individuals who may happen to benefit in unspecified
ways from the growth of general government revenues. In the 1986 Act,
where loophole closing allowed for massive rate lowering, the former
group—taxpayers en masse—constituted the beneficiaries. The costs of tax
reform tend to be concentrated, however, landing almost exclusively on
those groups that have heretofore gained from the particular preferences to
be pruned from the tax code.121 For example, if a tax reform bill along the
lines of the 1986 Act were to reverse the tax consequences of the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the reform bill’s costs would be concentrated
among “tackle box makers, Native American whaling captains, restaurant
owners, Hollywood producers, makers of bows and arrows, NASCAR track
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
119. Id. §§ 141–197.
120. Wilson, supra note 92, at 368.
121. CONLAN, WRIGHTSON & BEAM, supra note 54, at 193 (observing this cost-benefit
distribution in passing, but not exploring its consequences).
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owners, and importers of Chinese ceiling fans.”122 At the same time, the
bill’s beneficiaries would be the diffuse millions of taxpayers whose tax
rates might fall a little.
Quadrant 3 lawmaking is difficult. Laws from this quadrant rarely pass
and only do so with disproportionate amounts of effort or in very particular
circumstances.123 Take the example of the tax preference that NASCAR
track owners received in 2004 in the form of a preferred depreciation
schedule for NASCAR tracks.124 Whichever member of Congress inserted
that preferred depreciation schedule for NASCAR tracks into the 2004 Act
would likely not have even known that NASCAR owners needed a new
depreciation schedule unless a representative of that group came forward to
flag the issue. If, after 2004, a member of Congress attempted to excise this
established preference, that same interest group would spring into action.
The group would work with the members of Congress who have NASCAR
tracks in their districts to preserve the preference. A NASCAR facility in a
district presumably brings with it substantial economic stimulus and plenty
of jobs. To keep a track in his or her district, a member of Congress would
likely be willing to work to maintain the special treatment. In fact, the
member of Congress could probably find other members who needed to
preserve similar preferences for their own constituents, and the members
could agree to watch out for each others’ provisions.
At the same time, however, no interest group represents the hundreds of
millions of Americans who either lost a bit of government revenue due to
the favorable depreciation schedule or whose taxes had to go up to make up
for the lost revenue. No interest group staffer will make the rounds of
congressional offices pleading with members to remove the favorable
NASCAR depreciation schedule. Removing the schedule is a classic
Quadrant 3 project.
On occasion, tax reform may also fall within Quadrant 1 as a diffusecosts, diffuse-benefits law. Take efforts to reform the federal alternative
minimum tax (AMT) as an example. Most scholars, commentators, and
taxpayers agree that the federal AMT has spiraled out of control, both in
terms of complexity and in terms of the number of affected taxpayers.125
Initially designed to make sure that very high-income taxpayers paid a
minimum amount of tax regardless of available deductions or credits, the
AMT now hits many middle-income taxpayers and has become

122. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 44; see American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-357, §§ 102, 211, 332, 333, 335, 704, 713, 118 Stat. 1418, 1424, 1429, 1477, 1478,
1548, 1561 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
123. Wilson, supra note 92, at 370.
124. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 704.
125. See generally LEONARD E. BURMAN, JULIANNA KOCH, GREG LEISERSON & JEFFREY
ROHALY, TAX POLICY CTR., THE INDIVIDUAL ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (AMT): 12 FACTS
AND PROJECTIONS (2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/
411707_12AMTFacts.pdf.
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extraordinarily complicated.126 Members of Congress and presidential
candidates from both sides of the aisle have repeatedly called for
eliminating or at least substantially reforming the AMT.127 Aside from
annual temporary tinkering, however, the tax remains in place and only
grows larger and more burdensome with every year.128
Failure to pass lasting AMT reform is not, however, a Quadrant 3
problem. No concentrated interest group is currently benefitting from the
AMT, so no one has a particular incentive to protect it. But while the AMT
hits hundreds of thousands of middle-income Americans a year, its costs are
diffuse enough such that no one has sufficient incentive to push Congress
toward resolving the issue.
Understanding tax reform proposals as Quadrant 3 laws (or, less often,
Quadrant 1 laws) makes federal tax lawmaking paralysis easier to grasp.
As the federal tax lawmaking process currently works, no party to this
process has sufficient incentive to attempt to remove any one of the
loopholes and preferences currently pervading the tax code.129 The benefits
of pruning each are simply too diffuse. As a result, the provisions, with
their highly concentrated advantages, stay in the tax code indefinitely.
Members of Congress move along to other bills that incite less opposition
or provide concrete benefits to another target constituency. Reform efforts
remain paralyzed.

126. Id. at 2; see also LEONARD E. BURMAN, WILLIAM G. GALE & JEFFREY ROHALY, TAX
POLICY CTR., THE EXPANDING REACH OF THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 7–8, 10–11
(2005), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/411194_expanding_reach_AMT.
pdf.
127. See, e.g., Walter Hamilton, Obama Aims To Abolish a Detested Tax, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2012, at B1; Aviva Aron-Dine, Alternative Approaches to AMT Reform: Criteria
for Evaluation and Preliminary Assessments, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 1
(Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-2-07tax.pdf; Jim Meyers & Kathleen Walter,
Hatch: Middle Class Faces “Stealth Tax” Without AMT Reform, NEWSMAX (Nov. 28, 2012
3:39 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/US/hatch-alternative-minimum-tax/2012/11/28/id/
465738.
128. BURMAN ET AL., supra note 125, at 2.
129. Interest groups may have an incentive to remove other groups’ tax favors when a
group is proposing a new preference. As tax scholar Elizabeth Garrett documents in her
outstanding article on this topic, the congressional tax-writing committees have to comply
with certain offset requirements. As a result, in many cases, when a group wants a new
preference that will cost the government revenue, the revenue needs to come from a
reduction elsewhere. For this reason, interest groups often peruse lists of tax provisions,
looking for some that Congress might prune. But this practice does not do enough to end tax
lawmaking paralysis. No interest group proposing a new preference has any particular
attachment to any specific cut. As a result, if an interest group suggests paying for that new
preference by slicing some other group’s item and the attacked group fights back, the group
seeking the preference has an incentive to move on and proffer another way to pay for it that
inspires less resistance. These interest group battles occasionally cull the herd of
preferences, but the offset rules more often just make it somewhat more difficult to enact
new preferences and less often result in minor cuts and additional complexity within the
existing set. For a discussion of these issues, see Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics:
The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501
(1998).
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II. EARMARKING FEDERAL TAX REVENUES TO OVERCOME PARALYSIS
Given this federal paralysis problem, the question becomes, what tax
lawmaking alternatives are out there? What devices might serve as
potential vaccines against this paralysis that prevents tax lawmakers from
enacting widely supported tax reform bills that would provide benefits to
hundreds of millions of Americans?
The key is to find a way to move tax reform into one of the quadrants
where paralysis is less likely to occur. At first, this task may seem difficult,
given that tax reform seems like a classic diffuse-benefits situation, usually
a politically doomed Quadrant 3 law. Contemporary state-level tax
lawmaking, however, provides a striking alternative to the federal approach.
In particular, all fifty states earmark tax revenues for specific purposes.
With the notable exception of Social Security and Medicare, the federal
government has not had very much experience with earmarked taxes. The
revenue that the federal income tax collects goes into general revenues and
is not earmarked for any specific purpose.
When a governmental unit “earmarks” a tax, the governmental unit
“set[s] aside [the revenue] for a specific purpose or recipient.”130 In
contrast, nonearmarked taxes go into general revenues, a large pool of
money that the government later distributes for most of its spending
programs. While states vary in their earmarking practices, in 2005, states
were deriving on average 24 percent of their revenues from earmarked
taxes.131
Earmarking tax revenues for particular purposes, or taxing with purpose,
has the potential to move tax reform legislation into one of the quadrants—
often Quadrant 4, but sometimes Quadrant 2—that does not suffer from
paralysis problems. In this part, I explain why this is the case.
A. How Earmarking Works
States earmark tax revenues for a wide range of purposes. In this section,
I briefly describe the common types of earmarked taxes and discuss how
states precommit earmarked revenues.
Great variety exists among earmarked taxes at the state level. For
instance, highways receive motor fuel taxes in forty-five states.132 States
also fund highways through motor vehicle registrations (eight states) and
general sales taxes (seven states).133 Forty-six states earmark taxes for local
governments, most commonly transportation taxes.134 Thirty-five states
earmark taxes for both K–12 and higher education.135 Earmarked state

130. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 584 (9th ed. 2009). Again, I do not use this term to refer
to the practice of Congressional special-interest spending.
131. ARTURO PÉREZ, EARMARKING STATE TAXES 5 (2008).
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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taxes dedicate revenues to health and social services in almost as many
(thirty-four) states.136 Most programs for health services receive funds
from tobacco taxes (twenty-three states) and alcoholic beverage taxes
(thirteen states).137 Taxes earmarked for environmental causes receive
precommitted tax revenue in thirty states.138
To review the state taxes most frequently earmarked, the motor fuel tax
mentioned above is the most popular, and is earmarked in all but one
state.139 Twelve states earmark their motor vehicle registration fees.140
Also commonly earmarked are taxes on general sales (thirty-five states),
tobacco (twenty-six states), alcoholic beverages (twenty-three states), and
insurance and severance (twenty-six states each).141 Twenty states earmark
some of their income tax.142
Within this variety, earmarked state taxes fall, broadly speaking, into four
descriptive categories. The first kind of earmarked taxes are penalties,
which tax private activities that the state lawmakers view as
disproportionately costly to the general public.143 These include taxes on
cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling. Sometimes, states use these taxes to
force smokers, drinkers, and gamblers to finance, for example, antismoking,
antidrinking, and antigambling efforts, or otherwise to pick up the public
costs of these activities.
States also earmark penalty taxes for purposes that have nothing to do
with the penalized activity. A few examples of such penalty taxes include
Alaska’s cigarette tax, earmarked for the rehabilitation, construction, repair,
and associated insurance costs of state school facilities and for tobacco use
“education and cessation” (64.1 percent of the revenue collected through
this tax);144 Tennessee’s mixed-drink tax, earmarked for public schools
(45.4%) and for cities and counties (45.4%);145 and Idaho’s liquor tax,
earmarked for cities and counties (48.8%), community colleges (0.9%),
welfare programs (1.9%), alcohol treatment (3.6%), public schools (3.6%),

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VII, § 27; ALA. CODE §§ 28-3-53.2, -74, -184, -200 to
-205, 28-7-16 (LexisNexis 2003); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30001–30481 (West 2004);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-47.1-701, 24-22-117, 39-22-623 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27:91–:93, :270, :311–:312, :392–:393, 47:711–:727, :771–:788, :801–:815, :820.1–
:820.4, :1681–:1691, 51:781–:800 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 205.421, 431.301–
.336, 436.2201–.2207 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 240.15, 297F.10 (West 2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 35-5-22, 42-7A-63 (2002); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 183.021 (West 2012).
144. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.50.140 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
145. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-3-357, 57-3-302 to -306 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131,
app. D.
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court services (5.4%), and the state Department of Water Resources
(21.3%).146
The second type of earmarked taxes functions as service charges, which
tax users of specific state services or resources.147 These include taxes on
emergency services and very common taxes on the use of state natural
resources. States often channel these taxes to pay for providing the service
in question or renewing the affected resource, although states sometimes do
earmark these taxes for unrelated purposes. One example is Oklahoma’s
severance tax both on gas, earmarked for school districts (8.2%) and roads
(8.2%); and on oil, earmarked for school districts (14.9%), roads (7.4%),
education and student aid (66.9%), and water resources (3.7%), as well as
for a county fund for road and bridge upkeep (3.7%).148 Another is
Colorado’s minerals taxes, earmarked for public facilities in areas affected
by minerals mining (50%), development and conservation of water
resources (25.4%), geological surveys (1.4%), site cleanup (0.6%), mining
reclamation (1.8%), a water lawsuit settlement (10.8%), and a low-income
energy assistance program (5.3%).149
The third subgroup of earmarked taxes consists of redistributive taxes.150
These taxes include income and corporate taxes as well as inheritance and
estate taxes.
Examples include Maryland’s corporate income tax,
earmarked for public transportation (24%),151 and Illinois’s estate and
generation-skipping transfer tax, earmarked for counties (6%).152
Fourth, some earmarked taxes are blanket taxes, imposed on almost
every citizen or visitor to a state regardless of his or her behavior, use of
service, or ability to pay.153 These blanket taxes include the most prevalent
146. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 23-217, -404, -17, 63-10, -25 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131,
app. D.
147. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.51.120, 43.55.211,
43.75.130, 43.76.025, .150, 43.77.060 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-321, -323, 285801, -5808, -6001, -6008, -8335, -8345, 42-5202, -5304, -5205, -14255, 49-1031, -1036
(2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-4227 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 27-25-1 to -27, 27-25-501
to -525, 27-25-701 to -723 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-705 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4501, 4503-4, 5727, 5749 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 321.015,
.017, .152,. 324.340 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-13A-12b, -20a, 31-15A-16
(LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.37–.3965, .41–.42, .421, 76.01–.28, 168.12,
289.645 (West 2010).
148. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1001–1024 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
149. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-29-109 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
150. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-1 to 235-69, -92 to -113, 237-1 to -49 (West 2012);
IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-7-3 (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 148.010–.230, .540–.541, .610–.710,
178.896 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2351–2385.31 (West 2012); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-21-790, 12-16-510 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-41-67, 10-43-76, -77
(2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-103, 67-9-101 to -103 (West 2012).
151. MD. CODE ANN. TAX-GEN. §§ 2-613 to -615 (LexisNexis 2010); PÉREZ, supra note
131, app. D.
152. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1–/18 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
153. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 260; ALA. CODE §§ 16-16-11, 28-3-281, 38-4-12,
40-8-3, 40-17-146, -223, 40-21-51, -87, -100 to -107, -23-2, -35, -77, -85 to -88, -100 to -108
(2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.40.010 (West 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-224,
28-5720, -5852, 42-5008, -5010, -5029 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-5-301 to 302, 19-6-
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of all earmarked taxes: taxes on motor vehicles and fuel. Another popular
blanket tax is levied on tourists to a state, often specifically on the use of
hotel rooms. Another extremely common type of earmarked blanket tax is
the sales and use tax. The proceeds of these blanket taxes go for countless
different purposes, many of which have nothing to do with the taxed
activity. Examples include Idaho’s sales tax, earmarked for cities and
counties (11.5%), a multistate tax commission (0.1%), state building
maintenance (0.5%), water pollution control (0.4%), a county circuit
breaker (1.3%), and property tax relief (1.5%);154 and Missouri’s sales tax,
earmarked for school districts (24.6%), soil and water conservation (1.2%),
state parks (1.2%), conservation of natural resources, (3.1%) and state
highways (8.2%).155
All of these earmarked taxes share one key feature: they precommit tax
revenues to particular purposes before the government collects the tax.156
Upon paying the tax, taxpayers know where the revenue is going. States
have only rarely attempted to dip into earmarked taxes for nondesignated
purposes. Perhaps this is because tax earmarks often give legal recourse to
intended beneficiaries if lawmakers tamper with the promised revenue pool.
For instance, Wisconsin Medical Society, Inc. v. Morgan157 considers a
tax that the state of Wisconsin imposes on health care providers earmarked
for a medical liability “trust fund.” If a health care provider has to pay a
medical liability claim in excess of the provider’s statutorily mandated
liability insurance, the fund will make up the difference.158 Putting money
into a fund called a trust fund is quite common among earmarked taxes. In
2007, this particular fund had excess money, however, and the state of
Wisconsin diverted the money to a different medical fund.159 But health
care providers who paid the tax sued, claiming that the state could not use
these tax revenues for anything other than their designated purpose. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in favor of the medical providers. The
court held that the medical providers had a property interest in the trust fund
that “a future legislature is not free to confiscate.”160

301(3)–(4), 301(40), 301(182), 24-11-301, -809, 26-52-316, 26-55-205, -1002 to -1005, 1201, 26-56-201 to -202, -301, -502, 26-57-604, -610, 26-62-201, 27-70-104, 27-72-305, 27206-07 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 2-1001 to 2-1104 (LexisNexis 2012);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-65-121, 15-70-204 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105-164.1 to
.44D, 105-228.28 to .36, 105-449.37 to .139, 105-187.1 to .10 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-28-2720, -2750, 12-28-2910, 12-36-2620 to -2630, -2640; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.149, 82.04, 82.36, 82.38 (West 2008).
154. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3601 to -3641 (2007); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
155. PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
156. For more on how earmarked taxes precommit revenues and for a deeper look at the
topics discussed in the next few paragraphs, see my initial exploration of earmarking in
Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The Potential Benefits, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 55 (2006).
157. 787 N.W.2d 22 (Wis. 2010).
158. Id. at 27.
159. Id. at 30.
160. Id. at 46.
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Along the same lines, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reached a
similar result, based on a contract claim, in Tuttle v. New Hampshire
That case also
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n.161
concerned a tax on medical providers earmarked for a governmental fund to
cover medical liabilities in excess of the providers’ insurance.162 Here,
New Hampshire diverted excess money from that fund to pay for services
for medically underserved populations.163 The taxpaying medical providers
sued, arguing that the state had violated the contract it had with them. The
court held that New Hampshire had in fact violated the fund beneficiaries’
contractual rights by using the earmarked funds for a purpose other than the
one intended.164
Two things are notable about these cases. First, of course, these cases
demonstrate that beneficiaries of earmarked tax revenues have legal
recourse if states ever attempt to take away the earmarked funds. Second,
the cases point to the key role that beneficiary interest groups play in the
politics of earmarked taxes. In both Wisconsin Medical Society and Tuttle,
interest groups—the Wisconsin Medical Society, the New Hampshire
Medical Society, and the American Medical Association—took active parts.
As soon as the states attempted to divert the earmarked revenues away from
these interest groups, their members sprung into action and got the money
returned. These interest groups filed suit, submitted amicus briefs, and
coordinated the multiple plaintiffs. In both cases, the interest groups
exerted these efforts even though the trust funds in question were running
surpluses. In neither case did the trust fund actually deny a medical
provider’s claim. Using even excess funds for the nonearmarked purpose
was sufficient to spur the interest groups to action. These cases point to a
crucial feature of earmarked taxes: their beneficiaries protect them. This
feature allows earmarking to address tax lawmaking paralysis, which I
discuss in the next section.
B. How Earmarking Overcomes Tax Lawmaking Paralysis
Part I of this Article described a seemingly intractable problem. Federal
tax lawmaking efforts become paralyzed because proposed tax reforms
have concentrated costs and diffuse benefits. Laws with diffuse benefits are
extraordinarily difficult to pass and to sustain. Of these frequently stalled
diffuse-benefits laws, the ones that also have concentrated costs have even
more trouble. As a result, reform bills that close loopholes and eliminate
narrowly targeted preferences, while helping hundreds of millions of
Americans, cannot move out of Congress. On the rare occasion that such a
bill makes it through and becomes law, its accomplishments unravel almost
immediately after.

161.
162.
163.
164.

992 A.2d 624, 636–38 (N.H. 2010).
Id. at 630.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 641.
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Unlike federal tax reforms with their diffuse benefits, however,
earmarked taxes often have concentrated benefits. For this reason, many of
the earmarked state taxes fall into the two concentrated-benefits
quadrants—Quadrants 2 and 4. While certain earmarked taxes fall into
each quadrant of the cost-benefit matrix, a substantial number belong in the
ones with concentrated benefits. For example, state alcohol taxes
earmarked for programs at the county level concentrate benefits in the
residents of that county. State taxes that are earmarked for education
concentrate benefits in part in students represented by educational advocacy
groups and in teachers’ unions. State taxes earmarked for replenishing
natural resources benefit the groups that use and enjoy those resources. As
a result, these earmarked taxes and the programs they fund have identifiable
constituencies to support them.
Very often, in fact, earmarked state taxes fall into the most politically
advantageous concentrated benefit/diffuse cost quadrant—Quadrant 2.
Many of these state taxes fall on extremely broad-based groups (people who
buy things, people who earn income, people who use the roads, etc.), while
benefits accrue to relatively narrower groups. Among the many examples
are blanket taxes like Kansas’s motor vehicle tax, earmarked for the
construction of buildings at public universities (39.5%) and mental
institutions (18.6%),165 and income taxes like Michigan’s, earmarked for
K–12 public education (32.5%).166
States also have a number of Quadrant 4 tax laws, which have
concentrated costs and concentrated benefits. These laws include, among
many others, user fees like Mississippi’s oil (33.1%) and gas (22.6%)
severance taxes, earmarked for the source counties of the oil and gas.167
These Quadrant 4 laws also include a number of penalty taxes such as
Washington’s beer and wine tax, earmarked for cities (28.3%), counties
(7.1%) Washington State University’s research on wine and grapes (0.2%),
state Wine Commission operations (0.2%), border cities and counties
(0.2%), state health care programs (12.8%), and drug enforcement and
education (13.3%).168
The table below shows the cost-benefit framework described in Part II
with some examples of earmarked state taxes that fit into each quadrant.

165. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5109 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
166. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.51 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D.
167. MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-25-501 to -525, -701 to -723 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note
131, app. D.
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.24.210, .290 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app D.
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Table 2: Cost-Benefit Framework with Earmarked Tax Examples
Costs
Benefits

Diffuse costs

Concentrated costs

(1) Diffuse costs,
diffuse benefits
Nebraska’s sales
tax earmarked for
state, city, and
county roads and
streets
Hawaii’s gross
income tax
earmarked for debt
service

(3) Concentrated
costs, diffuse benefits
Alaska’s corporate
income tax on oil and
gas companies
earmarked for a
constitutionally
established budget
reserve fund
Indiana’s
gambling tax
earmarked for capital
projects

Concentrated
(2) Diffuse costs,
benefits
concentrated
benefits
North Dakota’s
property tax
earmarked for the
University of North
Dakota Medical
Center
California’s sales
tax earmarked for
health and social
services,
particularly mental
health services

(4) Concentrated
costs, concentrated
benefits
Minnesota’s tax on
mining operations
earmarked for the
University of
Minnesota
Texas’s tax on
attorneys earmarked
for public schools

Diffuse
benefits

The earmarked taxes in the concentrated-benefits quadrants, Quadrants 2
and 4, offer a particularly clear path out of tax lawmaking paralysis at the
federal level—where, once again, they have yet to be substantially tried.
Rather than impose a cost on a politically powerful or popular constituency
to provide a benefit spread across an entire population, these taxes do the
reverse. They spread a cost across an entire population, in many cases to
benefit a concentrated group. As a result, these laws would be much less
likely to give rise to tax lawmaking paralysis. As an initial matter, this
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cost-benefit theory suggests that these state earmarked tax bases are less
likely to erode than the federal income tax base. If an interest group
proposes an exception from a tax with concentrated benefits, that exception
will hurt one or more specific interest groups. That exception would be a
Quadrant 4 law giving rise to interest group politics. A suggested exception
in many earmarked taxes would pit two concentrated groups against each
other.169 Depending on the circumstances, the beneficiary group might be
able to stop the exception altogether. If the exception passed, it would
likely do less damage to the tax base than it would have had the beneficiary
group not been there to fight against it.170
Then, assuming that a special preference does manage to embed itself in
an earmarked tax with concentrated beneficiaries, a reform bill that
removed the preference would not be a paralyzed Quadrant 3 law. Again, it
would be a Quadrant 4 law, pitting two interest groups against each other.
Extending this model to the federal level, a member of Congress who would
propose to close a loophole in a tax benefiting a particular group will likely
hear from members of that group, who will provide a crucial counterweight
to the interest group advocating to keep the loophole open.
To take an example, recall the preferential depreciation schedule that
Congress gave to NASCAR track owners in 2004.171 Removing that
special treatment would be a classic doomed Quadrant 3 law. Any
lawmaker attempting to eliminate the preference would face a serious
paralysis problem. As things now stand, subjecting NASCAR tracks to the
same depreciation schedule as other similar assets would impose substantial
costs on a concentrated group, NASCAR track owners, while producing a
very small benefit for a large but diffuse group, the millions of U.S. citizens
who would either face higher taxes or lower government revenues due to
elimination of the loophole.
In contrast, imagine that Congress had followed the example of several
states and earmarked the income tax with the NASCAR loophole for a
particular purpose, such as federal funding for public schools. Under this
scenario, if a member of Congress attempted to eliminate the NASCAR
preference, that proposal would be one that would also raise revenue for the
public schools. As a result, education interest groups like public school
teachers’ unions and advocacy groups for public education would know that
a pending bill would benefit them (just as they know when a legislature is
considering an education subsidy). These interest groups would then
support the bill and lend assistance to federal legislators trying to eliminate
the NASCAR loophole.

169. See Wilson, supra note 92, at 368.
170. Id. Quadrant 4 politics are, in Wilson’s theory, compromise politics. If one group
manages to pass an exception to a tax benefitting another group, that likely represents a
compromise between the two groups. The group that allows the exception may not agree to
the compromise unless the exception is not that big.
171. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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In fact, some of the education groups might take the initiative and
approach members of Congress to suggest slicing this preference. A
member of Congress who had a particularly powerful teachers’ union in his
district might hear from a representative from the union demanding that the
favorable treatment be excised. The member might know that the union
lends its money and volunteer assistance only to candidates who are
responsive to the union and successfully help it accomplish its goals. For
this reason, the member would have a strong incentive to try to cut out this
preference. The member could then ally himself with other members with
strong teachers’ union support to propose legislation to that effect and to
see it through the legislative process. Of course, some other members of
Congress with NASCAR tracks in their districts would still have incentives
to preserve the favorable treatment. In any case, whether to keep the
loophole around would no longer be a fight between NASCAR-district
members and no defined constituency at all. Instead, the debate would be
between NASCAR-district members and teachers’ union–district members.
This balanced interest group competition would prevent paralysis. This
example demonstrates why federal tax reformers who are currently
encountering paralysis may want to consider some of the concentratedbenefits templates that states have used in their earmarked taxes. With
earmarking, Congress can move tax reforms out of the politically doomed
Quadrant 3 into the more politically promising concentratedbenefit/concentrated-cost Quadrant 4, earmarking a tax to benefit a
concentrated group and, in so doing, giving the tax built-in interest group
protection.
C. How To Address Earmarking’s Risks
Despite the potential advantages to earmarking identified so far,
increasing the use of earmarking might initially appear to present certain
risks. In view of these risks, although the members of Congress may find
earmarking a useful device for overcoming tax lawmaking paralysis, they
may not want to switch to funding government programs entirely out of
earmarked tax revenues. Setting certain limits on the extent to which
Congress earmarks revenues may, therefore, be appropriate. As mentioned
above, even the state governments, which rely more heavily on earmarking
than does the federal government, earmark on average only 24 percent of
tax revenues.172 The following section considers three of the possible risks
of earmarking, which Congress should weigh along with the potential
benefits of earmarking discussed above, when deciding whether to earmark
a particular revenue stream.
First, the specific manner in which earmarking configures statutory costs
and benefits may threaten the tax system’s progressivity. As the costbenefit matrix presented above shows, laws with concentrated benefits and
diffuse costs are easiest to pass. But individual taxes of this kind are not
172. PÉREZ, supra note 131, at 5.
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necessarily progressive. The current federal income tax is progressive,
designed so that it “takes a larger percentage of income from high-income
groups than from low-income groups” and “is based on the concept of
ability to pay.”173 In contrast, state sales and excise taxes are regressive,
designed so that “everyone, regardless of income level, pays the same fixed
amount . . . [which] . . . causes lower-income people to pay a greater
proportion of their income than higher-income groups pay.”174 Undeniably,
many earmarked taxes fall into this regressive category.
Although this fact is an important one, not every earmarked tax poses this
risk or poses it to a significant degree. Some earmarked state tax laws are
actually quite progressive in a broader, more substantive sense of that word.
They tax groups that are relatively well-off (high earners in some cases, but
even people who use roads or who buy things) to help groups that are not
well-off (poor children, indigent sick people). Thinking in terms of these
examples, one can imagine federal earmarked taxes that are progressive in
this same way. For instance, the federal government could impose a small
rate increase on the top 25 percent of corporations by earnings to fund
health care programs for those factory workers who the North American
Free Trade Agreement has displaced. In that case, the overall structure of
the tax would be progressive in its design and effect. The program would
tax a very sizeable but well-off group of taxpayers to help a group that is
smaller and more concentrated but poorer. For this reason, despite the
possible risk to progressivity, earmarking also creates opportunities to
redistribute income in a way that is, broadly speaking, quite progressive.
A second risk that earmarking could pose is restrictions on legislative
flexibility. When a legislature earmarks tax revenues for a particular
purpose, those revenues are not then available for future use in the generalrevenues pool. Scholarship on the theory of democracy has rightly
identified problems with measures that reduce future legislative flexibility.
Political theorist Stephen Holmes, for example, has lamented the fact that
political leaders precommit their successors to certain policies in efforts to
“remove certain decisions from the democratic process, that is, to tie the
community’s hands.”175 Against this practice, Holmes appeals to the
founding fathers, citing not only Thomas Paine’s belief that “[e]very age
and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and
generations which preceded it,”176 but also Thomas Jefferson’s famous
statement that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.”177 Beyond such
theoretical considerations regarding earmarking, assigning tax revenues to a
173. Theme 3: Fairness of Taxes, Lesson 3: Progressive Taxes, IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/
app/understandingTaxes/teacher/whys_thm03_les03.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
174. Theme 3: Fairness of Taxes, Lesson 2: Regressive Taxes, IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/
app/understandingTaxes/teacher/whys_thm03_les02.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
175. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 196 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1993)
(emphasis omitted).
176. Id. at 200.
177. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789).
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specific programmatic destination at the time of collection does—as a
practical matter—reduce a legislature’s ability to repurpose those funds in
accord with ever-shifting spending priorities.
These problems show only one side of the picture, however, because
earmarking need not entirely bind future congressional hands. This is true
for two basic reasons. One: an earmarked tax does not necessarily extend
indefinitely in time. In fact, many states earmark tax revenues for explicitly
limited periods of time. For instance, many states earmark revenues to
service particular debts; and as soon as the state pays off the debt, the
earmarked tax then expires. In these cases, legislatures are restricting their
options only for the stipulated period of time while they accomplish specific
purposes. Two: legislatures always remain free to revise statutes. For this
reason, insofar as the members of a legislature later change their minds
about the destination for certain earmarked tax revenues, nothing prevents
those legislators from rewriting the tax statute either to modify the
percentage of the tax allocated for the designated purpose or to eliminate
the earmarking feature altogether.
A third risk is that the costs of earmarking will fall on disempowered
groups. As described in detail above, earmarked taxes have the advantage
of giving the organized beneficiaries of a revenue stream a voice in the
legislative decisions that pertain to that stream. This being the case, interest
groups that gain from a particular tax can work to protect that tax. By the
same token, the political dynamics of earmarking afford no clear role for
groups that are politically disempowered. For this reason, organized
interest groups may be able to reap the benefits of earmarked taxes while
politically unorganized constituencies fail to do so.
Nevertheless, this third risk is by no means unique to earmarked taxes.
Groups that lack influence in the political process have equivalent
difficulties in obtaining benefits out of the general-revenue pool. In fact, in
the latter case, even if a disempowered group does manage in some year to
snag a few dollars from the general-revenue pool, the group may have
trouble holding on to its gains in the competition for those funds in
subsequent years. In other words, there is no compelling reason to believe
that the political dynamics of earmarking handicap powerless groups any
more than do the political dynamics of the existing tax lawmaking process.
D. Earmarking in Practice: Nonparalyzed Lawmaking
Part II.B outlined in broad, theoretical terms the way in which
earmarking taxes for particular purposes addresses tax lawmaking paralysis.
That section argued, based on interest group theory, that earmarked taxes
offer a promising path out of the paralysis that has plagued federal tax
reform efforts. To assess how well that interest group theory describes
actual tax lawmaking, the following sections discuss three situations in
which governments have in fact earmarked revenues, placing the taxes in
Quadrants 2 or 4. In each of these situations, interest group dynamics have
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played out in ways that point to earmarking’s potential effectiveness against
tax lawmaking paralysis.
1. Social Security
The federal government has little experience with earmarked taxes. Most
of the federal government’s earmarked taxes are relatively small, both in
revenue terms and in terms of the number of affected individuals.178 The
178. See, e.g., Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, 26 U.S.C. § 9505 (2006) (tax on
commercial cargo upon loading or unloading to ships earmarked for harbor maintenance);
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION
FINANCIAL STATISTICS 34 (2001), available at http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.
bts/files/publications/government_transportation_financial_statistics/2001/pdf/entire.pdf (tax
on airline tickets and aviation fuels earmarked for capital and other expenditures of the
FAA); FED. GAS TAX: HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES FROM 1965 TO 1995, TRANSTATS 1–4
(1997), available at http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/
transportation_statistics_newsletter/issue_02/pdf/entire.pdf (motor fuels excise tax
earmarked for highway construction and maintenance); OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION
& STATISTICS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 78
(1997), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/sspus/railroad.pdf (payroll tax
earmarked for old-age income support and equivalent program for railroad workers); OFFICE
OF UNEMPLOYMENT INS., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: FEDERALSTATE PARTNERSHIP 6 (2011), available at http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/
partnership.pdf (payroll tax earmarked for unemployment compensation); U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., CELEBRATING THE WILDLIFE & SPORT FISH RESTORATION PROGRAM 4, 7
(2004), available at http://digitalmedia.fws.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/document/id/1307
(tax on sport fishing equipment earmarked for management, conservation, and restoration of
fishery resources); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL AID IN WILDLIFE RESTORATION
560 (2005), available at http://www.fws.gov/budget/2007/FY%202007%20GB/23.00%20
federal%20aid%20in%20wR.pdf (tax on sporting arms and ammunition earmarked for
federal aid to wildlife restoration); Dennis M. Brown, The Nation’s Inland Waterway System
and Rural America, 16 RURAL AM. 11, 13 (2002), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/
12000/12300/12317/ra164c.pdf (tax on diesel fuel used in travel on commercial inland
waterways, earmarked for construction and rehabilitation projects on those waterways);
Robert L. Bamberger, The Abandoned Mine Land Fund: Grants Distribution & Issues,
NAT’L LIBR. ENV’T (Mar. 26, 1997), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs398/
m1/1/high_res_d/97-401_1997Mar26.html (tax on domestically mined coal earmarked for
abandoned mine reclamation); How is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.
medicare.gov/about-us/how-medicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2013) (payroll tax earmarked for old-age medical assistance); Leaking Underground Storage
(LUST) Trust Fund, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/swerust1/ltffacts.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (fuel excise tax earmarked for cleanup of sites with leaking
underground tanks); National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERV.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (excise tax on vaccine purchase earmarked for compensating
victims of vaccine injury); Office of the Asst. Sec’y for Policy, Health Benefits, Retirement
Standards, and Workers’ Compensation: Black Lung Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
(Sept. 2005), http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/guide/blklung.htm (tax on domestically
mined coal earmarked to compensate former mine workers who suffer from black lung
disease);
Recreational
Trails
Program,
FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN.,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/recreational_trails/funding/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2013) (tax on nonhighway recreational fuel use earmarked for development and maintenance
of recreational trails); Superfund: Twenty Years of Protecting Human Health and the
Environment, U.S. ENVT’L. PROT. AGENCY (2000), http://www.epa.gov/superfund/30years/
(tax on hazardous materials (oil and chemicals) earmarked for an environmental cleanup
fund called Superfund); U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fact Sheet: Recreational Boating Safety
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federal government does, however, fund one of its largest programs through
an earmarked tax: Social Security. Social Security is a Quadrant 2 law. It
imposes costs on a large and diffuse group, American employees and
employers, to fund a program for a narrower and more concentrated group,
older Americans. Social Security’s Quadrant 2 cost-benefit distribution is
among the factors that have prevented it from having a paralysis problem.
The federal income tax and the Social Security payroll tax have very
different histories. As described in the earlier parts of this Article, for
decades, the federal income tax base has continued to shrink as special
preferences erode it and efforts to reverse the trend become paralyzed.179
In contrast, an advisor to former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill
famously called Social Security the “third rail” of American politics,
explaining that no politician can undermine Social Security without facing
political death.180 This was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s intent when
he insisted on funding the program with an earmarked payroll tax.181 In her
seminal book on the history of Social Security, policy scholar Martha
Derthick explained that, at the program’s inception, lawmakers proposed to
fund it like any other federal program, out of general revenues.182 The
federal Committee on Economic Security, which initially drafted the plans
for Social Security, proposed to support it with a limited-rate earmarked tax
in the program’s early years but, once the needs of senior citizens exceeded
the revenues from that fixed-rate tax, to start turning to general revenues.183
President Roosevelt, in a manner described as “uncompromising,” opposed
this idea.184 Roosevelt believed that only an earmarked tax could protect
his program from attack by future generations. He told an observer:
[T]hose taxes were never a problem of economics. They are politics all
the way through. We put those payroll contributions there so as to give
the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions
. . . . With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my
social security program.185

Interest groups became immediately attached to the payroll tax. The
American Federation of Labor supported the tax from the beginning, telling
workers that, if the program was “financed with general revenues, they
Program, TEA-21 (Sept. 21, 1998), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21/factsheets/rbs.htm
(motorboat tax earmarked for boat safety); U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fact Sheet: Trust Funds
and Taxes, TEA-21 (Sept. 14, 1998), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21/factsheets/htf.htm
(motorboat gas excise tax earmarked for conservation of aquatic resources). For an excellent
discussion of earmarking at the federal level, see ERIC M. PATASHNIK, PUTTING TRUST IN THE
US BUDGET: FEDERAL TRUST FUNDS AND THE POLITICS OF COMMITMENT (2000).
179. See supra Part I.A.
180. Lawrence O’Donnell, Jr., Inconspicuous Valor, NEW YORK (Apr. 24, 2000),
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/politics/columns/nationalinterest/2851/.
181. MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 229 (1979).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL 308–09 (1959) (emphasis added).
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would ‘irresistibly be pulled down to relief standards.’”186 An issue of one
of the federation’s bulletins urged workers to accept the new tax, saying
that
[W]hen the money goes directly out of our pay, . . . people realize that it
is our insurance and we can have a strong voice in advising on the way
the insurance system works. The more social security protection we try to
build up, the harder it will be for us to get it and to see that it works
properly unless right in the books it shows that we are paying our
share.187

As the program expanded substantially over the rest of the century and into
the twenty-first, affected interest groups continued to protect the payroll
tax, preserving the program’s “fundamental popularity.”188 Interest groups,
particularly organized labor, senior citizens’ groups, and the legendarily
competent Social Security Administration continued to advocate hard for
increases in Social Security taxes so that, by the late 1970s, “[p]otential
opponents of expansion were so conditioned to expect defeat that they
anticipated expansion and, in anticipating it, made concessions to it.”189
The Social Security payroll tax has continued to grow and no
countervailing interest group has made any serious effort to undermine it.
Whereas the income tax base, as discussed, has hundreds of exceptions and
special favors, the Social Security wage base has almost none. Taxpayers
pay income tax based on their “taxable income,” a figure that is generally
much smaller than their total earnings because it reflects so many
carveouts.190 Taxpayers pay Social Security tax on the Social Security
wage base, which essentially equals their total wage amount up to a certain
figure without any carveouts.191 Politicians who have suggested cuts to
Social Security have had no success thus far. In fact, these lawmakers face
their own version of a Quadrant 3 paralysis problem. Lawmakers who want
to prune Social Security presumably do so in the hopes of reducing the
burden on the large and diffuse group of working Americans who pay
Social Security taxes. Reducing Social Security taxes threatens to impose
costs on a relatively narrower and politically well-represented group: the
elderly.192 This doomed Quadrant 3 plan never progresses.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

DERTHICK, supra note 181, at 230.
Id. at 230–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 377.
Id. at 407.
See I.R.C. § 63 (2006).
See 42 U.S.C. § 409 (2012); see also IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, (CIRCULAR E)
EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 14–17 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf.
192. In 2012, vice presidential candidate Representative Paul Ryan proposed a potential
decrease in Social Security benefits that would not affect anyone over the age of fifty-five.
See HOUSE BUDGET COMM., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICAN
RENEWAL 52 (2012), available at http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosperity
2013.pdf. In so doing, he attempted to turn cutting Social Security—usually a doomed
diffuse-benefits, concentrated-costs Quadrant 3 proposal—into a more politically promising
diffuse-benefits, diffuse-costs Quadrant 1 proposal. Had Ryan won the vice presidency, he
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Derthick explains, “politicians . . . in their candid moments acknowledge
that the social security benefits incorporated in law are sacrosanct.
Reduction is simply unthinkable, no matter what the method of financing or
the inflationary effects might be.”193 President Roosevelt understood how
earmarking afforded Social Security this degree of protection and reduced
its vulnerability to the political dynamics that have entrenched loopholes in
the federal tax code. With hindsight, Derthick agrees with Roosevelt’s
initial prediction, writing that, “[h]ad social security been . . . financed by
general revenues, the preceding history would be very different.”194
2. Municipal Bonds
The history of Social Security offers a key example of how earmarking
has prevented lawmaking paralysis in the one area where the federal
government has experimented with an earmarked tax. Given the federal
government’s limited experience with earmarked taxes, a detailed
understanding of how they work and how they might address paralysis
requires examining lower levels of government. As discussed in Parts II.A–
B, the states have relied heavily on earmarked taxes. Yet there is little
scholarship on the subject; only a few scholars in political science have
studied the mechanism in one particular related form: local-level municipal
bonds. In the next section of this Article, I offer several case studies that
make a first effort at studying the dynamics of these earmarked state taxes.
Before turning to the state-level case studies, this Article considers
municipal bonds and the ways in which the municipal bond literature
further highlights the earmarking mechanism’s potential to undo tax
lawmaking paralysis.
Municipal bonds present an unexpected dynamic that resembles the one
seen in the context of Social Security lawmaking. Despite the conventional
wisdom that voters rarely elect to increase their own taxes and the oftrepeated understanding that a candidate cannot win public office with a
promise to raise taxes, voters have never balked at increases in their Social
Security taxes, as discussed in the previous section. Similarly, in the
context of municipal bond issues, voters regularly vote to increase their
own taxes in certain and concrete ways. One other feature unites Social
Security and municipal bonds: both involve earmarked taxes.
Local governments rely heavily on municipal bond issues to raise money
for particular capital projects. This became especially true in the 1980s and
1990s after the Reagan Administration cut federal spending for local
endeavors and began a trend of routing more funds through state capitols
rather than channeling them directly to local municipalities.195 Bond issues
may have had more success with it than past lawmakers who have hoped to reduce or rein in
Social Security.
193. DERTHICK, supra note 181, at 414–15.
194. Id. at 420.
195. See Susan A. MacManus, Financing Federal, State, and Local Governments in the
1990s, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 23 (1990).
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often require voters to approve a tax increase dedicated for a particular
purpose, typically a specific project.196 Municipal bond issues frequently
succeed. In fact, in the context of commonly requested bond issues for
education, one study showed that only a quarter of school districts have
ever had a bond issue rejected.197
Bond issues are generally Quadrant 2 policies with diffuse costs and
concentrated benefits. When bond issues pass, all property taxpayers’ taxes
go up a small amount to finance a project that will help a small,
concentrated group, such as a defined group of schools. Affected interest
groups usually lobby on behalf of the bond issue, making the case about the
benefits of the particular project at hand. Scholars have found that these
interest groups play a key role in bond issues, often distributing information
about the proposal.198 Studies have shown that voters are more likely to
vote for a bond issue if they know more about the planned use of the funds,
especially the ways in which the funds might benefit their community.
Interest groups can disseminate this information effectively.
A seminal study showed that bond issues were more likely to pass when
local leaders recruited neighborhood associations to work on behalf of the
bonds by touting the benefits that the bonds would have for the individual
neighborhoods.199 This study concerned a bond referendum in St. Louis
that sought to impose “nearly a dollar per hundred incremental increase in
property taxes; an amount of eye popping proportions to many voters.”200
While bond referenda are often successful, at the time of this study, St.
Louis had been having trouble passing them due to demographic shifts that
turned the city’s population into one that generally opposed taxes.201 In the
referendum considered in the study, St. Louis officials worked to energize
interest groups around the issue by emphasizing the ways in which the
proposal concentrated benefits in particular neighborhoods. The recruited
neighborhood associations assisted with “a carefully orchestrated
newspaper and direct-mail campaign for the entire ‘package’ [of proposed
bonds that] stressed specific neighborhood benefits.”202 In this direct-mail
campaign, voters received information on street, sidewalk, park, and other
improvements designed for their immediate vicinity should the bond
package succeed.203
This strategy of spurring interest group activity and highlighting the
concentrated benefits of the proposal proved largely successful. While only
196. Kent L. Tedin, Richard E. Matland & Gregory R. Weiher, Age, Race, Self-Interest
and Financing Public Schools Through Referenda, 63 J. POL. 270, 270 (2001).
197. See, e.g., id.
198. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities,
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 658–64 (2012).
199. J. Clark Archer & David R. Reynolds, Locational Logrolling and Citizen Support of
Municipal Bond Proposals: The Example of St. Louis, 27 PUB. CHOICE 21, 25 (1976).
200. Id. at 27.
201. Id. at 25.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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one of the proposed bond issues got the two-thirds vote necessary for
passage, eight of the ten bonds in the package received majority approval,
an uptick from previous campaigns that had less heavily emphasized the
concentrated benefits of the proposals and featured less interest group
activity.204 Perhaps even more remarkably, this study demonstrated that,
when tax increases are earmarked for concrete benefits for particular
segments of a voting population, a majority of even a generally antitax
voting population may be willing to increase its own taxes to pay for those
benefits.
Similarly, a more recent study examined another city that had historical
trouble with bond issues: Jackson, Mississippi.205 In this study, Jackson’s
school superintendent was aware that earlier bond referenda had provided
little information about the actual destination of the funds.206 The
superintendent worked to provide voters with additional information about
the planned uses of the bond money, as had been done in St. Louis. He and
other school administrators “put together a bond issue that was actually a
set of ten ‘mini’ bond issues, a checklist of different items that voters could
choose to individually support or reject.”207 With the new mini bond issue
approach, voters could “cast separate votes to air condition and renovate the
schools, replace portable classrooms, purchase new library books, construct
new science labs, purchase new computer equipment, and build new athletic
facilities.”208 “With this novel approach to the ballot, a list of projects
spread throughout the city, and a clear presentation of the needs of the
school district,” the superintendent “sought to build a coalition of
supporters, and he lined up support from civic leaders, The (Jackson)
Clarion-Ledger, the business community, and even administrators from
some of Jackson’s private academies.”209 The only opposition to the bond
204. Id. at 27.
205. James M. Glaser, White Voters, Black Schools: Structuring Racial Choices with a
Checklist Ballot, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 35 (2002).
206. Id. at 37.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. Many earmarked taxes first become law through referenda, and the informationproviding role that interest groups can play becomes particularly important in the context of
referenda. Political science scholarship has noted that referenda often lack the partisan cues
usually present on ballots. For that reason, endorsements and other elite cues can help voters
figure out how to vote in the absence of the usual partisan information. See Susan Banducci,
Searching for Ideological Consistency in Direct Legislation Voting, in CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS 132 (Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds., 1998); Jeffrey
Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS, supra, at 151; David McCuan, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Ken
Fernandez, California’s Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and the Initiative
Process, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra, at 76. See generally Shaun Bowler & Todd
Donovan, Information and Opinion Change on Ballot Propositions, 16 POL. BEHAV. 411
(1994); Regina P. Branton, Examining Individual-Level Voting Behavior on State Ballot
Propositions, 56 POL. RES. Q. 367 (2003); Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Campaign
Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections, 17 POL. BEHAV. 287
(1995); Mark R. Joslyn & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Guns in the Ballot Box: Information,
Groups, and Opinion in Ballot Initiative Campaigns, 28 AM. POL. Q. 355 (2000); Arthur

2013]

MAKING IMPOSSIBLE TAX REFORM POSSIBLE

2719

was some “disorganized” griping from a white supremacist group.210 This
novel approach led to one of the first bond issue victories in recent Jackson
history, with over half the requested funding approved.211
Like the St. Louis case, this bond issue demonstrated how earmarked
taxes can harness the power of interest group dynamics in concentratedbenefit, diffuse-cost scenarios. The bonds in question imposed small costs
on most of the Jackson community and produced substantial benefits for the
beneficiaries of the proposed education projects. When the superintendent
provided information to the community about the concentrated benefits
available from the earmarked bond revenues, he was able to mobilize
interest groups in support of the bonds. With no effective opposition, this
strategy convinced over 60 percent of a traditionally antitax electorate to
vote to raise their own taxes to generate revenue for school
infrastructure.212
As in the case of Social Security, the experiences of earmarked taxes in
the bond context differs markedly from the dynamics of federal income tax
lawmaking. Part I.A discussed how deeply unpopular the income tax has
become among taxpayers who believe they are getting nothing in return for
the taxes they pay. In contrast, the earmarked taxes studied in the context
of bond issues generally inspire the opposite sentiment. When informed
about the concrete benefits of the earmarked taxes, voters agree to raise
them, even imposing burdens that the voters themselves know they will
bear. Raising revenue through bond issues is not paralyzed. Federal
income tax lawmaking is.
3. Earmarked State Taxes: Case Studies
The previous two sections have drawn on the experience gleaned from
the federal government’s primary venture with earmarked taxes and from
local bond issues. Legal scholars and social scientists have studied these
two situations in some detail, and their research suggests that earmarking
offers an opportunity to subvert tax lawmaking paralysis.
No scholarship to date has examined, however, the governmental site in
which the most, and most diverse, earmarking occurs: state tax laws. As
described in detail in Part II.A–B, states earmark on average 24 percent of
their revenues for particular purposes and do so in a variety of ways.213
The following sections take a closer look at several earmarked state taxes
and their interest group dynamics in an effort to assess their potential for
addressing tax lawmaking paralysis.

Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
390 (1992); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994).
210. Glaser, supra note 205, at 37.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See PÉREZ, supra note 131, at 3.
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To develop these case studies, I compiled a list of the many taxes with
clearly concentrated benefits from the several hundred earmarked state
taxes. From that list, I randomly selected four earmarked state taxes. Then,
I conducted archival research about the four taxes. Using legislative
history, earlier versions of statutes, reports from legislative committees,
historical tax-rate data, floor debates from state legislatures, back issues of
newspapers, and publications from various interest groups, I assembled the
four case studies that I describe here.
a. Colorado’s Tobacco Tax Earmarked for Public Health
In November 2004, Colorado voters overwhelmingly approved a
constitutional amendment that would increase state cigarette and tobacco
taxes (Amendment 35) and earmark the funds for public health, specifically,
health care for underserved individuals.214 A 1992 Colorado constitutional
amendment known as the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) requires that a
majority of voters approve all tax increases in a statewide election.215 As a
result, tax increases such as this one require not just legislative approval but
a referendum. In this case, faced with such a referendum, 61 percent of
Coloradans voted for both the tax increase and to earmark the new revenues
for particular purposes relating to public health.216 These purposes
included expanding coverage and increasing eligibility in Medicaid and
Colorado’s Child Health Plan (46 percent of revenue), funding
comprehensive primary care through community health centers that
primarily serve the uninsured and indigent (19%), supporting programs
focusing on tobacco education, prevention, and cessation (16%), and paying
for programs focusing on prevention, early detection, and treatment of
cancer and cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases (16%).217
A coalition of organizations called Citizens for a Healthier Colorado
sponsored the referendum.218 The member groups included a number of
potential tax beneficiaries, among them, a children’s advocacy group called
the Colorado Children’s Campaign, the American Cancer Society, the
American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, an
antismoking group called the Colorado Tobacco Education and Prevention
Alliance, the Colorado Hospital Association, two health-advocacy
nonprofits called the Colorado Consumer Health Initiative and the Colorado
Prevention Center, a community health center organization called the
Colorado Community Health Initiative, and the National Jewish Children’s
214. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 21.
215. See id. § 20(4).
216. See Amendment 35/Tobacco Tax Funding at CDPHE, COLO., http://www.colorado
.gov/cs/Satellite/CDPHE-PSD/CBON/1251618137524 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
217. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 21(5)(a)–(d).
218. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SUSTAINING STATE FUNDING FOR TOBACCO CONTROL:
A STORY FROM COLORADO 1 (2011) [hereinafter A STORY FROM COLORADO], available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/program_development/sustainingsta
tes/pdfs/colorado.pdf.
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Hospital.219 The chairs of Citizens for a Healthier Colorado were chairs of
a children’s advocacy group and the president emeritus of Colorado State
University.220 The group raised $2.1 million to campaign for the earmarked
tax, which the coalition did through extensive advertising on television and
radio and through direct mail.221 This campaign’s most common refrains
included the presence of a “health care crisis . . . in Colorado,” the fact that
the earmarked funds would address pervasive “health issues such as cancer
and heart and lung diseases,” and the comprehensiveness of a program that
“would address not only tobacco prevention and control but also the
prevention, early detection, and treatment of cancer and heart and lung
disease.”222 Observers largely attribute the tax’s passage to the efforts of
this group.223 Neither the tobacco industry nor any other interest group
appears to have actively opposed this Quadrant 2 amendment.
Furthermore, in the years since this earmarked tax increase passed, no
group has made any substantial effort to challenge or cut away at the tax,
which has continued to provide a steady source of funds for its designated
purposes.
Nor is the Colorado experience unusual in these respects. Indeed, the
commonwealth of Virginia has had a similar history of an active public
health coalition lending support and protection to a cigarette tax increase
earmarked for a health care trust fund.224 Notably, states that have tried
funding similar health initiatives out of general revenues have had less
success.225 This may be because, as I have argued, the states fail to identify
concentrated constituencies to support the tax. For example, although
Nebraska’s legislature approved a $7 million appropriation from general
revenues for this purpose in 2000, the legislature cut that figure down to
$405,000 three years later, citing budget concerns.226

219. COLO. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, AMENDMENT 35 SYMPOSIUM: GETTING A GOOD
HEALTHY RESTART TO FUNDING (2012), available at http://publichealthpractice.org/sites/
default/files/forum/16394/a35-symposium-presentations.pdf.
220. A STORY FROM COLORADO, supra note 218, at 2.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1–2.
224. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SUSTAINING STATE FUNDING FOR TOBACCO
CONTROL: SNAPSHOT FROM VIRGINIA (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/
tobacco_control_programs/program_development/sustainingstates/pdfs/virginia.pdf.
225. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SUSTAINING STATE FUNDING FOR TOBACCO
CONTROL: SNAPSHOT FROM NEBRASKA (2009) [hereinafter SNAPSHOT FROM NEBRASKA],
available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/program_development/
sustainingstates/pdfs/nebraska.pdf; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SUSTAINING STATE
FUNDING FOR TOBACCO CONTROL: A STORY FROM NEW YORK (2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/program_development/sustainingsta
tes/pdfs/newyork.pdf.
226. SNAPSHOT FROM NEBRASKA, supra note 225, at 1.
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b. Missouri’s Sales and Use Tax Earmarked for Conservation
In 1984, Missouri voters approved a constitutional amendment that
would earmark a portion of the state’s sales and use tax for soil and water
conservation and for the acquisition, development, maintenance, and
operation of state parks and historic sites.227 To get on the ballot in
Missouri required a petition drive from the measure’s advocates. An active
coalition of Missouri and national organizations supported this earmarked
tax, including the Missouri Conservation Commission, the Citizens
Committee for Soil, Water and State Parks, the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources, the Coalition for the Environment, the Missouri Farm
Bureau, the Conservation Federation of Missouri, the Missouri Parks
Association, the Sierra Club, the Soil Conservation Society, the Audubon
Society, and several individual farms. Their combined campaign in favor
of the tax highlighted Missouri’s high rate of soil erosion, farmers’ inability
to pay for necessary soil protection, and state residents’ frequent use of the
state parks. The amendment faced only a small degree of resistance, mostly
from St. Louis–area groups that believed that the amendment unfairly
helped rural residents while doing nothing for urban areas.
Since its electoral victory in 1984, voters have steadily renewed the
tax.228 The initial amendment required state residents to vote to renew the
tax periodically after its passage.229 As a result, the tax had to appear on
the ballot again in 1988, 1996, and 2006.230 Each time, a coalition of
supporters again had to sponsor a petition drive to get the measure on the
ballot and, each time, this happened without problems. The earmarked tax
passed each time with overwhelming margins of support.231 At no time
since 1984 has anyone seriously attempted to reduce or otherwise
undermine the tax, and it has been a reliable source of funds for its intended
purpose throughout its twenty-eight years.
c. Utah’s Income Taxes Earmarked for Education
Utah earmarks its entire personal and corporate income taxes, which have
been in place since 1931 and 1948 respectively, for K–12 and higher
education. This arrangement has given rise to a community of interest
groups that mobilize in support of the earmarked tax, the vast majority of
these groups consisting of those that work on public education issues. The
groups that have been most vocal about the tax in its recent history have
included Utah Voices for Children, the Utah School Board Association, the
Utah School Superintendent Association, the Utah Education Association,

227. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 47(a)–(c).
228. Parks, Soils and Water Sales Tax, MO. STATE PARKS, http://mostateparks.com/page/
55069/parks-soils-and-water-sales-tax (last visited Mar. 19. 2013).
229. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 47(c).
230. See Parks, Soils and Water Sales Tax, supra note 228.
231. See id.
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the Davis Education Association, and the Utah Association of Public
Charter Schools.
In the recent histories of these two earmarked taxes, the taxes have been
relatively stable, although they do have some “subtractions” and credits.
Subtractions against state income taxes in Utah are available for, among
several other items, interest on government bonds232 and income from
Native American reservations.233 Taxpayers may then take credits against
tax liability for agricultural fuel,234 stay-at-home parents,235 solar
projects,236 special needs adoptions,237 and taxes paid to another state,238
among others. Although interest groups may have supported the tax laws
actively, these exceptions suggest that they have not been entirely
successful in protecting it from encroachment by other interest groups
seeking preferences.
On the other hand, the interest groups involved seem to have been
successful at keeping the income tax a steady source of revenue for public
schools throughout its history. Utah’s corporate tax rate has been steady
since 1984, and several credits are currently available with regard to this
tax.239 Until 2008, the income tax had a reasonably constant rate structure.
Over the past twenty years, the income tax had also been reasonably free of
any new special preferences.240
Facing a large budget surplus in 2008, Utah cut those rates to a flat 5
percent. The advocacy groups campaigned heavily against reducing the tax
rate.241 In this instance, however, these interest groups lost the battle to
another coalition of Utah groups that advocated for the rate reduction,
including the Utah Taxpayers Association and a group of business leaders
known as the Employers’ Education Coalition.242 The pro-cut groups also
had the support of many Utah politicians, including then-Governor Jon
Huntsman. Despite the efforts of the education groups, Utah’s political
bodies were able to amass sufficient political will to cut the tax in the face
of education-group opposition.
Perhaps due to this opposition or

232. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-114(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
233. Id. § 59-10-114(2)(b).
234. Id. § 59-13-202.
235. Id. § 59-10-1005.
236. Id. § 59-10-1024.
237. Id. § 59-10-1104.
238. Id. § 59-10-1003.
239. Id. §§ 59-1-401 to -403, 59-7-101 to -805; State Corporate Income Tax Rates, 2000–
2012, TAX FOUND., http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-corporate-income-tax-rates-20002012 (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
240. The small handful of carveouts pertained to disabled individuals, adopted children,
American Indian tribes, and people of Japanese ancestry who had been interned during
World War II.
241. Bob Bernick Jr., Coalition Seeks To Dump Flat-Tax System, DESERET NEWS (Sept.
19, 2008, 12:22 AM MDT), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700259889/Coalitionseeks-to-dump-flat-tax-system.html?pg=all.
242. Howard Stephenson, Claims of 2008 Income Tax Hike Inaccurate, UTAH TAXPAYERS
ASS’N (Apr. 14, 2008), http://www.utahtaxpayers.org/?p=215.

2724

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

subsequent budget conditions, Utah’s income tax has remained stable since
the rate cut of 2008, without further rate reductions or new carveouts.
d. Oklahoma’s Income Tax Earmarked for Teachers’ Pensions
Since 2003, Oklahoma has earmarked an increasing percentage of its
individual and corporate income taxes for the Oklahoma Teachers’
Retirement System. It was at that point that beneficiary interest groups
became involved in income tax politics in Oklahoma, and, in particular, a
number of education and retirement-related advocacy organizations started
to work on income tax issues. They have stayed involved through the
present time.
After the Oklahoma legislature partially earmarked the income tax for
education, the income tax rate fell somewhat, but the income tax base has
not eroded in any significant way. In 2004, the legislature cut income tax
rates.243 The same year, the criteria to obtain a credit for sales tax paid
became more stringent.244 In addition, Oklahoma residents approved a
referendum to increase the tax exemption for retirement benefits, to
eliminate personal and corporate income taxes on capital gains from the
sale of Oklahoma-based property, and to tighten eligibility criteria further
for the sales tax credit.245 In 2005, the legislature cut the top marginal
personal income tax rate and increased the standard deduction and the
amount of retirement benefits excludible from taxable income.246 The
legislature also enacted some simplifying reforms.247 The legislature did
the same thing again in 2006 with regard to the rate, the standard deduction,
and the exclusion for retirement benefits.248
In 2007, the legislature slightly lowered the rate again and inserted a state
program modeled on the federal child-care credit.249 In 2008, the only
legislative change to the income tax introduced a new voluntary compliance
initiative250 and in 2009, the only change added an exclusion for income
from the U.S. Armed Forces.251 The year 2010 brought a reform-oriented
package that put a two-year moratorium on credits against personal income
tax liability.252 In 2011, the legislature exempted an aerospace credit from
the full credit moratorium253 and added a credit for contributions to a
scholarship-granting organization.254 These small exceptions suggest that
243. Compare H.B. 2660, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2004), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 68,
§ 2355 (2003).
244. H.B. 3152, 46th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1998).
245. H.B. 2660.
246. H.B. 1547, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2005).
247. Id.
248. H.B. 1172, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006).
249. S.B. 861, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2007).
250. S.B. 2034, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2008).
251. S.B. 881, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2009).
252. S.B. 1267, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010).
253. H.B. 1008, 53d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011).
254. S.B. 969, 53d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011).

2013]

MAKING IMPOSSIBLE TAX REFORM POSSIBLE

2725

the interest groups had a reasonable degree of success in protecting their
revenue source.
In 2011, the tax’s beneficiaries faced their first major challenge in
protecting the tax. Oklahoma’s conservative new governor, Mary Fallin,
proposed a plan to phase out the state income tax slowly. Polls showed that
most state residents supported this plan, as did majorities in the state senate
and assembly. In addition, Governor Fallin’s plan had support from a
number of out-of-state antitax advocacy groups.
The plan failed, however, despite this widespread support, and despite
the fact that Governor Fallin’s party controlled both the Oklahoma House of
Representatives and Senate.255 Bemoaning this fact, a Wall Street Journal
editorial in the spring of 2012 wrote, “A cavalcade of lobbyists, including
local Chambers of Commerce, teachers unions and welfare groups are
fighting the tax cut.”256 The article complained that “Republicans in the
Oklahoma Senate are . . . letting the special-interest pressure get to
them.”257 Governor Fallin similarly attributed the plan’s failure to intense
special-interest group activity.258 In an editorial, the Daily Oklahoman also
pointed out the power of interest groups in defeating the cut, explaining,
“[a]verage Oklahomans weren’t clamoring for a tax cut. Unlike in Kansas,
neither was the business lobby. Tax consumers such as the public
education establishment would like taxes raised, not lowered.”259 The
interest group clamor featured voices from a number of groups, including
the Oklahoma Pension Oversight Commission, Oklahoma’s American
Association of Retired Persons, the Oklahoma Education Association, a
liberal advocacy group called the Oklahoma Policy Institution and a Tulsa
antipoverty group called the Community Action Project. As observers
noted, these groups played a critical role in this battle over the income tax.
Their opposition, the commentary suggests, may have been the major
obstacle in the way of Oklahoma’s would-be eliminators of the income tax.
4. Lessons from Case Studies
The four brief case studies of earmarked taxes and their development
demonstrate the political dynamics of earmarking. Notably, in all four of
the case studies described here, each tax has beneficiary interest groups that
are actively involved in advocating for the tax and in protecting its
revenues. Colorado’s tax on cigarette companies earmarked for public
health is a Quadrant 4 tax with concentrated costs and concentrated
255. 2011 Current Partisan Composition Map, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/2011-current-partisan-composition-map
.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
256. Editorial, Oklahoma Reform Showdown, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2012, at A14.
257. Id.
258. Tim Talley, Fallin Says Lobbyists Doomed Tax Cut, TULSA WORLD (June 2, 2012,
10:27 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=298&articleid=201206
02_298_0_OKLAHO524725.
259. Editorial, Tax Cut Wound Up Not Happening, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 29, 2012, at
8A.
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benefits. Efforts to prevent or remove special exceptions from this tax
would fall into Quadrant 4, pitting concentrated loophole-seekers against
concentrated beneficiaries. Missouri’s sales and use tax earmarked for
natural resources is a Quadrant 2 tax with diffuse costs and concentrated
benefits. Similarly, stopping any narrowly tailored preferences from
rooting themselves in this tax would be a Quadrant 4 endeavor. Utah’s
income tax earmarked for public education is a Quadrant 2 tax with diffuse
costs and concentrated benefits. Again, reforms here would belong in
Quadrant 4. Oklahoma’s income tax earmarked for public health is
similarly a Quadrant 2 tax with diffuse costs and concentrated benefits. As
with the first three taxes, trying to keep these laws free of targeted favors
would give rise to Quadrant 4 politics.
The concentrated beneficiaries of each of these taxes all play key roles in
the tax lawmaking process surrounding their taxes. In Colorado, a coalition
of public health groups that stand to benefit directly from the cigarette tax
revenues, including hospitals, community health centers, and children’s
health groups were the impetus behind getting the referendum on this tax
onto the ballot. This group also spent millions of dollars on passing the
referendum and was extremely successful. Perhaps aware of the interest
group momentum behind the tax, the tobacco industry, which would bear its
concentrated costs, seems to have steered largely clear of the referendum
debate. Since the tax passed, the legislature has made no effort to cut it.
Again, perhaps legislators realize the strength of support this tax has and
understand that chipping away at the tax would only awaken the ire of these
interest groups. At the same time, given the absence of tobacco-industry
activity surrounding this tax, reducing the tax would not provide a benefit to
any engaged constituency. As a result, this earmarked tax remains a steady
source of revenue for its beneficiaries.
In Missouri, the sales and use tax earmarked for conservation has a
similar, actively involved protective constituency. The tax specifically
benefits natural resources and farmers, and both environmental groups and
farm groups have worked hard to develop and maintain this tax. Referenda
both created and renewed this tax, and, in both cases, the interest groups
had to mount a concerted campaign to get the issue on the ballot. They had
to work to advocate for it and succeeded both times. In each case, the tax
passed by an overwhelming margin. Given the diffuse costs of a sales and
use tax, Wilson’s theory might predict that these groups would face no
opposition and have as easy a fight as they could expect over a referendum
that would raise all voters’ taxes. The story of this tax largely bears out that
expectation. Only a handful of interest groups spoke out against this tax.
The groups in question were urban groups representing the St. Louis
metropolitan area. They objected not so much to the tax, but to its focus on
rural areas. From the tone of their materials, these groups seemed more
interested in finding ways to funnel taxpayer funds to St. Louis than in
making sure money stayed away from rural groups. Perhaps because of this
focus or because the number of opposed interest groups was reasonably
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small, the pro-tax environmental and farm groups appeared to have carried
the day entirely in Missouri, protecting these tax revenues steadily for
nearly thirty years.
In Utah, the concentrated beneficiaries of the income tax are education
groups, many of which have been actively involved in trying to protect and
grow income tax revenues. While a number of education groups are vocal
participants in tax debates, these groups have not had the success of some
other concentrated beneficiaries of earmarked taxes. The income tax in
Utah does have a few credits and deductions—clearly not the thousands
found in the federal code—and has faced across-the-board cuts in the past
several years. The debate over these cuts has made evident how engaged
education groups are in Utah’s income tax debates. A number of advocates
for public education, children, and teachers fought hard against those cuts
but, in the face of substantial, unified political will to lower the rates, the
interest groups lost the battle. At times, their opponents have presumably
included interest groups hoping to carve special preferences into the tax
code but, in this most recent fight, the income tax’s supporters went up
against a coordinated political effort on the part of state Republicans facing
a large budget surplus. Their defeat in 2008 notwithstanding, Utah’s
education-oriented interests remain a key part of that state’s tax debates and
continue to oppose cuts in the income tax, including those that would create
loopholes.
Oklahoma’s income tax, earmarked in part for teachers’ pensions, has
inspired a broad coalition of supporters, including education advocacy
groups, teachers’ unions, organizations of retired persons, and nonprofits
focused on children’s issues. These groups are also extremely engaged in
Oklahoma tax lawmaking. Perhaps because the number of groups is so
large and includes members as powerful as the American Association of
Retired Persons and Oklahoma’s largest teachers’ union, the tax’s
protectors have had a fair amount of success. Since the income tax was first
earmarked for teachers’ pensions, the legislature has carved out almost no
special preferences. The legislature declared in 2009 a temporary
moratorium on a huge bundle of the targeted items that had entered the code
before the earmarking. In 2011, when the income tax faced a serious threat
from a Republican governor whose party controlled both houses of the state
legislature, the protector groups banded together and executed an effective
campaign that observers credit with preserving the state income tax.
In all of these cases, the earmarked tax beneficiaries played extremely
active roles in bolstering their taxes. This dynamic stands in sharp contrast
to federal income tax lawmaking, where the diffuse beneficiaries of the
federal income tax and of federal income tax reform are not substantially
engaged in tax policymaking. Unlike in federal income tax politics, in all
of these states, preventing the tax base from eroding is not a doomed
Quadrant 3 endeavor but is instead a politically advantaged Quadrant 2 or 4
project. The paralysis present at the federal level is largely absent at the
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state level, pointing to the opportunity that tax earmarking has to help
overcome federal tax lawmaking paralysis.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the problem of federal tax lawmaking paralysis
in detail. Tax lawmaking paralysis has plagued the federal government for
decades. Presidents since Kennedy have attempted to reform the tax code
by ridding it of special preferences for particular interest groups.
Nevertheless, reform efforts have seemed impossible to pass and to sustain.
Even the most successful reform effort, the 1986 Act, collapsed almost
entirely in the years after its passage.
This Article applied a cost-benefit framework to understand why tax
reform faces such overwhelming paralysis at the federal level. In particular,
this Article argued that loophole-closing tax reform proposals that might
benefit many citizens struggle, politically speaking, in comparison with tax
laws that help small, tightly concentrated groups. Tax laws that impose
costs on a diffuse citizenry tend to have an easier time passing and
remaining on the books than laws that impose costs on small, tightly
concentrated groups.
This Article then proposed a solution to this paralysis problem that
lawmakers from both sides of the aisle have been unable to shake. In
particular, this Article argued that earmarking taxes for particular purposes
offers an opportunity to overcome tax lawmaking paralysis. Using
evidence from the federal government’s primary experience with
earmarking, from earmarking efforts at the local level, and from four statelevel case studies developed from archival research, this Article
demonstrated how taxing with purpose gives rise to political dynamics that
can free federal tax policymakers from their paralysis problem.

